Saving Mental Fictionalism from Cognitive Collapse

Wallace, Meg

doi:10.11612/resphil.2016.93.2.5

Cited by 9 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 27 publications

(24 reference statements)

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“…So mental fictionalism is incoherent: the very act of stating the position requires commitment to the existence of mental states. This is perhaps the most serious objection facing mental fictionalism, and I cannot hope to deal with it properly here (for fuller discussions, see Wallace 2014, Joyce 2013, Parent 2013. The most promising response for the fictionalist, I believe, echoes Churchland's (1981) well-known response on behalf of eliminativism (see also Wallace 2007, Joyce 2013).…”

Section: Challengesmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Fictionalism and the Folk

Toon¹

2016

The Monist

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Mental fictionalism is the view that, even if mental states do not exist, it is useful to talk as if they do. Mental states are useful fictions. Recent philosophy of mind has seen a growing interest in mental fictionalism. To date, much of the discussion has concerned the general features of the approach. In this paper, I develop a specific form of mental fictionalism by drawing on Kendall Walton's work on make-believe. According to the approach I propose, talk of mental states is a useful pretence for describing people and their behaviour. I try to clarify and motivate this approach by comparing it to well-known alternatives, including behaviourism, instrumentalism and eliminativism. I also consider some of the challenges that it faces.

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Section: Challengesmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Finally, and perhaps most worryingly, a critic might argue that mental fictionalism is incoherent (e.g. Wallace 2007, 2014, Daly 2013, Joyce 2013, Parent 2013. The charge of incoherence mirrors a well-known objection to eliminativism.…”

Section: Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fictionalism and the Folk

Toon¹

2016

The Monist

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“…One reason it is important is that it allows us to address a serious difficulty facing the approach, often called the problem of 'cognitive collapse' (e.g. Wallace, 2016). The fictionalist claims that inner representations do not exist and that our talk about them is merely a useful fiction.…”

Section: Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, a number of authors have begun to explore fictionalist approaches to folk psychology (e.g. Demeter 2013; Toon, 2016;Wallace 2007Wallace , 2016. In this paper, my aim is not to offer general arguments in favour of fictionalism, or against representationalism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minds, materials and metaphors

Toon¹

2020

Philosophy

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What is the relationship between mental states and items of material culture, like notebooks, maps or lists? The extended mind thesis (ExM) offers an influential and controversial answer to this question. According to ExM, items of material culture can form part of the material basis for our mental states. Although ExM offers a radical view of the location of mental states, it fits comfortably with a traditional, representationalist account of the nature of those states. I argue that proponents of ExM would do better to adopt a fictionalist approach to mental states. In so doing, I suggest, they could retain the important insights underlying the extended mind thesis, while avoiding its more problematic consequences.

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“…In this way, an eliminativist would be still able to use belief talk and consequently say that she does believe in eliminativism, whilst still denying that that there are any beliefs. This solution is controversial (see Wallace 2016 for the overview of the debate on the consistency of mental fictionalism), but it shows that the problem of attitudes is not necessarily fatal for eliminativism.…”

Section: Eliminative Materialism and The Problem Of Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics

Posłajko

2018

Acta Anal

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The aim of this paper is to propose a new reading of eliminative materialism concerning propositional attitudes, along the lines of broadly understood Carnapian metametaphysics. According to the proposed reading, eliminativism should be seen as a normative metalinguistic claim that we should dispose of terms like Bbeliefs^and associated linguistic rules. It will be argued that such reading allows a significant philosophical problem which besets eliminativism to be solved: the problem of representation. The general idea of the problem of representation, which is taken to be one of the aspects of the celebrated Bcognitive suicide^issue, is that an eliminativist has a problem with maintaining that her position represents reality. It will be argued that on the Carnapian reading an eliminativist might put forward a negative ontological claim without the need to invoke any representationalistic notions.

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Saving Mental Fictionalism from Cognitive Collapse

Cited by 9 publications

References 27 publications

Fictionalism and the Folk

Fictionalism and the Folk

Minds, materials and metaphors

Eliminativism: the Problem of Representation and Carnapian Metametaphysics

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