SARS‐CoV‐2 outbreak investigation in a German meat processing plant

Guenther, Thomas; Czech-Sioli, Manja; Indenbirken, Daniela; Robitaille, Alexis; Tenhaken, Peter; Exner, Martin; Ottinger, Matthias; Fischer, Nicole; Grundhoff, Adam; Brinkmann, Melanie M.

doi:10.15252/emmm.202013296

Cited by 146 publications

(137 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…[ 14 ]; who also concluded that “nearly all SSEs [super spreading events] in the database took place indoors.” [ 15 ] identified 318 outbreaks each with a minimum of 3 cases, comprising a total of 1245 confirmed cases in 120 prefectural cities in non-Hubei provinces, China, and found that none occurred in outdoor settings. High attack rates of COVID-19 have also been found in choir rehearsal [ 7 , 16 ], homeless shelters [ [17] , [18] , [19] ]; nightclubs [ 20 ]; Fitness centers [ 21 , 22 ] and meat processing plants [ 23 ]. Although airborne transmission has been suspected in many of these outbreaks, ventilation rates were not measured in the infection venues.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probable airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a poorly ventilated restaurant

Qian

Hang

et al. 2021

Building and Environment

406

345

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Although airborne transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has been recognized, the condition of ventilation for its occurrence is still being debated. We analyzed a coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak involving three families in a restaurant in Guangzhou, China, assessed the possibility of airborne transmission, and characterized the associated environmental conditions. We collected epidemiological data, obtained a full video recording and seating records from the restaurant, and measured the dispersion of a warm tracer gas as a surrogate for exhaled droplets from the index case. Computer simulations were performed to simulate the spread of fine exhaled droplets. We compared the in-room location of subsequently infected cases and spread of the simulated virus-laden aerosol tracer. The ventilation rate was measured using the tracer gas concentration decay method. This outbreak involved ten infected persons in three families (A, B, C). All ten persons ate lunch at three neighboring tables at the same restaurant on January 24, 2020. None of the restaurant staff or the 68 patrons at the other 15 tables became infected. During this occasion, the measured ventilation rate was 0.9 L/s per person. No close contact or fomite contact was identified, aside from back-to-back sitting in some cases. Analysis of the airflow dynamics indicates that the infection distribution is consistent with a spread pattern representative of long-range transmission of exhaled virus-laden aerosols. Airborne transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 virus is possible in crowded space with a ventilation rate of 1 L/s per person.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probable airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a poorly ventilated restaurant

Qian

Hang

et al. 2021

Building and Environment

406

345

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“…Although physical barriers installed between meat processing workers on the production line and at cafeteria tables would block larger respiratory droplets, the primary mode of transmission according to the CDC ( 22 ), they would not fully protect against aerosol transmission. Moreover, low temperatures and limited fresh air supply combined with physically demanding work conditions could facilitate longer-range aerosol transmission ( 25 ). Enhancements in ventilation (e.g., increasing the number of air exchanges per hour, installing high efficiency particulate air [HEPA] filtration) should therefore be considered the most effective engineering control for COVID-19.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission among Meat Processing Workers in Nebraska, USA, and Effectiveness of Risk Mitigation Measures

Herstein¹,

Degarege²,

Stover³

et al. 2021

Emerg. Infect. Dis.

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I n the early months of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, meat processing facilities became among the largest epicenters of COVID-19 outbreaks in the United States (1). Declared a critical infrastructure industry in April 2020 (2), meat processing facilities are particularly vulnerable to COV-ID-19 because of the high density of workers required for operations, prolonged close contact of personnel on the production line, indoor work environments with compact cafeteria and locker room areas, and a workforce with diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds that make educational efforts more challenging (3). A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report found that, as of May 31, 2020, >16,000 workers in meat and poultry processing facilities in the United States had been diagnosed with COVID-19 and 86 had died (4); as of October 2020, those case counts and deaths had more than tripled (5). Meat processing facilities in Nebraska employ ≈26,000 workers (6). The fi rst COVID-19 illness among meat processing facility workers in Nebraska was identifi ed March 9, 2020. As of July 2020, cases had been reported among workers in 23 Nebraska meat processing facilities. The University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) and Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services partnered to mitigate COVID-19 risks in Nebraska among workers in this industry. Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services expanded case investigations and contact tracing teams and coordinated 2 mass testing events with participating meat processing facilities. UNMC created evidence-based guidelines for facilities (7) and assembled a team of infectious disease and infection prevention and control (IPC) experts to provide onsite and virtual technical assistance to facilities to evaluate gaps in IPC practices and provide facility-specifi c IPC recommendations. Local and state health departments conducted case investigations to collect information on demographics, employer, occupation, industry, illness descriptions, medical history, and outcomes among Nebraska meat processing workers. Moreover, although industry-specifi c guidelines for mitigating COVID-19 transmission in meat processing facilities have been issued by CDC and other public health

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“…The viral genomes from the first and second episode of infection were sequenced from the pharyngeal swab material and were named #HH-24.I and HH-24.II, respectively. Amplicon sequencing and a bioinformatic analysis were performed, as recently published [ 13 , 14 ]. Library generation was performed using the CleanPlex SARS-CoV-2 Panel (Paragon Genomics, CA, USA).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

SARS-CoV-2 Reinfection in a Healthcare Worker Despite the Presence of Detectable Neutralizing Antibodies

Brehm

Pfefferle

Possel

et al. 2021

Viruses

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So far, only a few reports about reinfections with SARS-CoV-2 have been published, and they often lack detailed immunological and virological data. We report about a SARS-CoV-2 reinfection with a genetically distinct SARS-CoV-2 variant in an immunocompetent female healthcare worker that has led to a mild disease course. No obvious viral escape mutations were observed in the second virus variant. The infectious virus was shed from the patient during the second infection episode despite the presence of neutralizing antibodies in her blood. Our data indicate that a moderate immune response after the first infection, but not a viral escape, did allow for reinfection and live virus shedding.

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SARS‐CoV‐2 outbreak investigation in a German meat processing plant

Cited by 146 publications

References 18 publications

Probable airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a poorly ventilated restaurant

Probable airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a poorly ventilated restaurant

Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission among Meat Processing Workers in Nebraska, USA, and Effectiveness of Risk Mitigation Measures

SARS-CoV-2 Reinfection in a Healthcare Worker Despite the Presence of Detectable Neutralizing Antibodies

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