Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict

Abstract

Economic sanctions are frequently used as a tool of foreign policy, described by some as falling between diplomacy and military force. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary, or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals, the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs, there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. Democracies, because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs, while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender, are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions.

Regime type, issues of contention, and economic sanctions: Re-evaluating the economic peace between democracies

“…Lektzian & Sprecher (2007) further find the risk of escalation is even greater for democracies because audience costs generated by the imposition of sanctions make it relatively more difficult to later back down. In situations of high politics with heightened dangers of escalation, democracies may be more wary of employing sanctions against each other.…”

Complying with Human Rights

“…Accordingly, ratification of a human rights treaty is by no means costless, as it sends a signal to domestic audiences (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007;Simmons 2009). Following this signal of treaty ratification, domestic groups demand higher levels of compliance (Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011).…”

International Trade and The Onset and Escalation of Interstate Conflict: More to Fight About, or More Reasons Not to Fight?

“…I argue that it does not necessarily follow logically from the relative constancy of trade volume (or interdependence) that it has no potential role in interstate crisis communication. First, trade can be cut as a signaling tool, as is done during embargoes or sanctions, even if they do not achieve their stated goals (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007). For example, Venezuela cut important high-volume cross-border trade with Colombia, attempting to signal its resolve during a militarized dispute in 2008 (EFE News Service, 4 March 2008).…”