Safety and Security Interference Analysis in the Design Stage

Abstract

Safety and security engineering have been traditionally separated disciplines (e.g., different required knowledge and skills, terminology, standards and life-cycles) and operated in quasi-silos of knowledge and practices. However, the co-engineering of these two critical qualities of a system is being largely investigated as it promises the removal of redundant work and the detection of trade-offs in early stages of the product development life-cycle. In this work, we enrich an existing safetysecurity co-analysis method in the design stage providing capabilities for interference analysis. Reports on interference analyses are crucial to trigger co-engineering meetings leading to the trade-offs analyses and system refinements. We detail our automatic approach for this interference analysis, performed through fault trees generated from safety and security local analyses. We evaluate and discuss our approach from the perspective of two industrial case studies on the space and medical domains.

Synchronisation of an Automotive Multi-concern Development Process

“…An alternative, more ad-hoc approach to synchronisation is suggested by Martinez et al, where interference analyses trigger co-engineering meetings and trade-off analyses [14]. The bottom-up triggering mechanism with a loose connection to governing processes could be a disadvantage for assessment, process control, and ease of adoption but might be preferable in agile development.…”

Will safety-security co-engineering pay off? A quality and cost perspective in two case studies

“…2) Safety and Security in the design (SafSecDesign): A combined safety and security component local analysis is performed using component fault trees [17] to model and reason on the interferences caused because of safety and security undesired events. An example on the usage of component local analysis combining safety and security can be found in [18].…”