Sacrificial Symbolism in Animal Experimentation: Object or Pet?

Abstract

Based on ethnographic research in biomedical laboratories, this paper argues that sacrifice is an ambivalent notion in the culture of animal experimentation, requiring both objectification of and identification with the animal. Because of this ambivalence, laboratory animals are not accorded a single, uniform, and unchanging status but seen simultaneously as objects and pets. Animals are objectified by incorporation into the protocol, by deindividualization, by commodification, by isolation, and by situational definition. At the same time, laboratory workers develop pet-like relationships with the animals, which may be treated as enshrined pets, liberated pets, saved pets, or martyred pets.

Toward a psychology of human–animal relations.

“…Based on the Cartesian tradition, the belief that animals do not feel pain the same way humans do and that they can hence be used for human purposes is still endorsed to some degree in Western societies (Bekoff, 2007). This belief holds despite the fact that animals are used for experimentation based on the premise that they are similar to humans and that we share many of the same physiological functions-including pain (Arluke, 1988;Pious, 2003).…”

“…In fact, and as the current review demonstrates, the literature covers our relations with a wide diversity of animals, from dogs and cats to insects and snakes. Yet, few articles have proposed a systematic and integrative framework to organize the findings of the human-animal relations literature by accounting directly for animal species and types (for a notable exception, see Serpell, 2004, who synthesized the work of Arluke, 1988, Kellert, 1980Kellert & Berry, 1980, and Hills, 1993.4 Distinguishing among species and types of animals is impor tant because how we categorize and evaluate animals has concrete repercussions for how we treat them and for the quality of our relations with them. Our human categorization of animals may also allow us to compartmentalize species and types of animals in distinct groups, avoid feeling conflicted over the highly differential treatment received by different species and types of animals, and provide a rationale for why we allocate moral obligations to some animals but not others Serpell, 2009).…”

Model homes for model organisms: Intersections of animal welfare and behavioral neuroscience around the environment of the laboratory mouse

“…While scientists may attempt to maintain a stance that treats laboratory animals as scientific objects, numerous scholars have observed the slippages between subjective and objective perceptions of the animal in everyday scientific work (Arluke, 1988;Lynch, 1988;Crist, 1999;Haraway, 2008). Michael Lynch (1988) has argued that researchers need to have expertise in dealing with the alive, fuzzy, "naturalistic" animal in order to conduct animal experiments, but that these skills are treated as a kind of "subjugated knowledge" that is not recognized as an important form of knowledge in and of itself.…”

Institute of Laboratory Animal Resources (ILAR)

“…The degree of distress experienced by people observing or performing euthanasia depends on their backgrounds, personal philosophies, and ethical views on the use of animals in research (Arluke, 1988). People often transfer to the death of animals their unpleasant reactions to human death, and their responses to euthanasia can be magnified when strong bonds exist between them and the dogs being killed (e.g., strong bonds often develop between animal-care personnel and seriously ill canine models that require a great deal of care and rely totally on their human guardians).…”