S-modular games and power control in wireless networks

Altman, Eitan; Altman, Zwi

doi:10.1109/tac.2003.811264

Cited by 197 publications

(153 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…It is shown that through the interaction-learning process, a certain Quality of Service (QoS) can be guaranteed. In (Saraydar, Mandayam & Goodman 2002, Altman & Altman 2003, Huang et al 2006 super-modular games have been used to design various power control algorithms arising in wireless networks. A key feature of super-modular games is strategic complementarity-if a player chooses a higher action, the others want to do the same.…”

Section: 7mentioning

confidence: 99%

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Kakhbod

Nayyar

Sharma

et al. 2013

Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

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Section: 7mentioning

confidence: 99%

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Kakhbod

Nayyar

Sharma

et al. 2013

Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

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“…Therefore, it is important to address the issue of existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a power game. One approach used in [12] to establish the existence of equilibrium in single-input-single-output (SISO) power games is the framework of supermodular games which relies on the monotonicity of best response function. However, this approach is not readily applicable to the MIMO case.…”

Section: A Power Game and Generalized Nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…is obtained, any link k updates its own covariance matrix according to (12) where 0 ≤ α k (t) ≤ 1 is a parameter that represents the k-th link's willingness to optimize (in other words, 1 − α k (t) is the k-th link's inertia) at step t. The inertia prevents the links from overreacting and generally helps with the convergence of the updates.…”

Section: Best Response Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power games in MIMO interference systems

Arslan

Demirkol

Yüksel

2009

2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

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Abstract-We consider a multi-link and multi-input-multioutput (MIMO) interference system in which each link wishes to minimize its own power by choosing its own signal vector subject to an information theoretic Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirement. Our setup leads to a multi-link game, referred to as a "power game", in which the feasible strategy set of an individual link depends on the strategies of the other links. We characterize the rates for which an equilibrium solution exists in a power game in terms of the equilibria of "capacity games" introduced in our earlier work [1]. We provide an example where the set of equilibrium rates is properly contained in the set of achievable rates. We provide a conservative estimate of the region of equilibrium rates using a minmax approach. We discuss the uniqueness of equilibrium as well as the convergence of best response dynamics (a.k.a. iterative water-filling) for all rates when the interference is sufficiently small and some other mild conditions are met. Finally, we extend our results to the case where the QoS requirements are softened.

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“…Let κ denote the space of all strategies. We present the property of increasing differences (supermodularity) with the following definition [4].…”

Section: ) Learning Theory In Repeated Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-cooperative power control for wireless ad hoc networks with repeated games

Long

Zhang

et al. 2007

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

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Abstract-One of the distinctive features in a wireless ad hoc network is lack of any central controller or single point of authority, in which each node/link then makes its own decisions independently. Therefore, fully cooperative behaviors, such as cooperation for increasing system capacity, mitigating interference for each other, or honestly revealing private information, might not be directly applied. It has been shown that power control is an efficient approach to achieve quality of service (QoS) requirement in ad hoc networks. However, the existing work has largely relied on cooperation among different nodes/links or a pricing mechanism that often needs a third-party involvement. In this paper, we aim to design a non-cooperative power control algorithm without pricing mechanism for ad hoc networks. We view the interaction among the users' decision for power level as a repeated game. With the theory of stochastic fictitious play (SFP), we propose a reinforcement learning algorithm to schedule each user's power level. There are three distinctive features in our proposed scheme. First, the user's decision at each stage is self-incentive with myopic best response correspondence. Second, the dynamics arising from our proposed algorithm eventually converges to pure Nash Equilibrium (NE). Third, our scheme does not need any information exchange or to observe the opponents' private information. Therefore, this proposed algorithm can safely run in a fully selfish environment without any additional pricing and secure mechanism. Simulation study demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed scheme.

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S-modular games and power control in wireless networks

Cited by 197 publications

References 11 publications

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Power games in MIMO interference systems

Non-cooperative power control for wireless ad hoc networks with repeated games

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