Ryle, the Double Counting Problem, and the Logical Form of Category Mistakes

Paraphrase, categories, and ontology

“…13 I have elsewhere argued that 'cross-categorial counting'-e.g. saying one substance and one non-substance yields a total of two things-violates certain logical-cum-metaphysical rules (Goldwater, 2018). That argument buttresses the argument given here, as it effectively predicts that failing to draw the relevant category-distinction will generate a sense of strangeness, by dint of violating the above-mentioned rules (whether one is aware of those rules or not).…”

¿fantasma en La Máquina? Algunas Objeciones a Ryle Para Conocimiento De Conductistas

“…Una mejor estrategia de aproximación es describir la estructura del error categorial para evitar cualquier confusión. Al respecto, Goldwater (2018) ha argumentado que el error categorial de Ryle ha sido mal entendido constantemente y cuya distorsión e interpretación dominante es que se trata de un error del tipo sujeto-predicado (Fx), cuando en realidad los errores categoriales a los que se refiere son de doble conteo por conjunción, es decir, estos errores de cuantificación y conjunción que ocurren cuando se cuenta dos veces la misma cosa.…”

The Form is Not a Proper Part in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z.17, 1041b11–33

“…There is discussion in the literature on what Ryle meant exactly by ' category mistake'. 10 The most comprehensive account of Ryle's concept of category mistake is provided by Goldwater (2018), who dubs it ' conjunctive-cum-quantificational category mistake' and expresses it in the following logical form: 'there are n things (of one type) and 1 thing (of another type), such that there are n + 1 things' (2018: 342). Let us see how Goldwater applies it to one of Ryle's examples.…”