Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How

Abstract

Contemporary discussions of knowledge how typically focus on the question whether or not knowing how to do φ consists in propositional knowledge, and divide the field between intellectualists (who think that it does) and anti-intellectualists (who think that it does not, and that it consists instead in the possession of the ability to φ). This way of framing the issue is said to derive from Gilbert Ryle. I argue that this is a misreading of Ryle, whose primary interest in discussing knowledge how was not epistemological but rather action-theoretical, whose argument against intellectualism has for this reason been misunderstood and underestimated (by Jason Stanley, among others), and whose positive view aims to chart a middle course between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.

Practical Knowledge and Habits of Mind

“…have (Ryle, 1946, p. 234; 1949, pp. 30–34; Bäckström and Gustafsson, 2017; Small, 2017). Ryle sharply distinguishes intelligent capacities from habits, warning that,

competences and skills … are certainly second natures or acquired dispositions, but it does not follow from this that they are mere habits.

…”

“…There are many possible positive views of the nature of skill and know‐how that reject intellectualism, and ‘anti‐intellectualism’ is an apt name for some but not others. Despite the fact that Ryle is typically labelled an anti‐intellectualist, careful attention to his writings (Small, 2017) and their historical context (Kremer, 2017b) shows that he sought a middle path between two positive views: intellectualism on the one hand, and on the other, an alternative that deserves—substantively and historically—the name ‘anti‐intellectualism’ (a term Ryle did not use).…”

“…11Ryle argued against a version of intellectualism, but contemporary intellectualists—in my view mistakenly (Small, 2017)—consider his arguments inadequate. Intellectualists disagree among themselves about how to understand knowledge‐how: compare, for instance, Stanley and Williamson, 2001, with Waights Hickman, 2019.…”

“…55On why this widespread attribution is mistaken, see Hornsby, 2011, pp. 81–82; Small, 2017, §4; Waights Hickman, 2019, §§3–4.…”

Ryle on knowing how: Some clarifications and corrections

“…It seems clear that Ryle thinks of the “intellectualist legend” as a causal theory: What makes an action intelligent is the fact that it has the right kind of causes (see e.g., Ryle, 2009, pp. 8–9, 22, 39; see also Small, 2017, pp. 58–61).…”