Russian Strategic Narratives on R2P in the ‘Near Abroad’

Abstract

This article assesses Russian strategic narratives towards its interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014–16) based on a new database of 50 statements posted on the websites of the Russian Mission to the United Nations and the President of Russia homepage. By looking more broadly at Russian strategic narratives aimed at persuading other global actors and publics abroad and at home, this article identifies how Russia attempted to develop a story that could win global acceptance. This analysis shows that contrary to traditional Russian emphasis on sovereign responsibility and non-intervention, Russia supported claims for self-determination by separatist groups in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia used deception and disinformation in its strategic narratives as it mis-characterized these conflicts using Responsibility to Protect (R2P) language, yet mostly justified its own interventions through references to other sources of international law. Russian strategic narratives focused on delegitimizing the perceived opponents, making the case for the appropriateness of its own actions, and projecting what it proposed as the proper solution to the conflicts. It largely avoided making any references to its own involvement in the Donbas at all. Additionally, Russia’s focus on the protection of co-ethnics and Russian-speakers is reminiscent of interventions in the pre-R2P era.

“Ukraine commits genocide on Russians”: the term “genocide” in Russian propaganda

“…It was a lesson they could apply in 2014 with respect to Ukraine. This accords with Pupcenoks and Seltzer (2021), who assessed Russian strategic narratives regarding its interventions in Georgia ( 2008) and Ukraine (2014)(2015)(2016) and also conclude that Russia employed deception and disinformation in its strategic narratives, using what they call "Responsibility to Protect language", while mostly justifying its own interventions through references to other sources of international law.…”

“…These data can be seen as illustrative of the way terms like "genocide" are used in the Russian propaganda (cf. the method used in Pupcenoks & Seltzer, 2021). During recent decades, the Russian media landscape was not entirely controlled by the Russian state, and various media took an independent and critical stance toward the Russian government (e.g.…”

“…Finally, Binder and Kaltseis (2020) provide an analysis of media techniques in covering the events in Odessa in 2014. Pupcenoks and Seltzer (2021) conducted an exhaustive search of statements on the website of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations and on the official homepage of the President of Russia for the time periods covering the conflict in Georgia and the beginning of the conflicts in Ukraine, and looked at Russia's rhetoric in these conflicts. They conclude that Russia uses language selectively to promote its self-interest and that its rhetoric changes depending on whether the given situation leads to loss or gain of territory or influence.…”

Strategically matching messaging to the platform: The case of “Biolabs” on Instagram, Facebook, and Reddit

“…Strategy can also be derived through the positioning of messaging. While overarching discourse is framed around a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) which might justify Russian action, particularly in Georgia and Ukraine (in 2014), the actual discourse in the communication campaigns focus on delegitimizing the other side (Pupcenoks & Seltzer, 2021). From this we can infer that this is a zero-sum communication game, which allows Russian operations a level of plasticity to take incoherent positions between campaigns, as their strategic objective is to delegitimize the other side (Pupcenoks & Seltzer, 2021, p. 772).…”

“…While overarching discourse is framed around a “responsibility to protect” (R2P) which might justify Russian action, particularly in Georgia and Ukraine (in 2014), the actual discourse in the communication campaigns focus on delegitimizing the other side (Pupcenoks & Seltzer, 2021). From this we can infer that this is a zero-sum communication game, which allows Russian operations a level of plasticity to take incoherent positions between campaigns, as their strategic objective is to delegitimize the other side (Pupcenoks & Seltzer, 2021, p. 772). By manipulating the rhetorical framing of responsibility inherent in human rights and humanitarian intervention discourse to justify the needs of Russian statecraft, the Russians delegitimize transnational institutions writ large.…”