Russian “Islamic” Diplomacy: Organization of Islamic Cooperation

Kosach, G.

doi:10.31696/2542-1530-2020-4-96-126

Cited by 1 publication

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“…Another strand of scholarship on Chechnya's international relations focuses on the paradiplomacy of Grozny under Ramzan Kadyrov's leadership (2007-to date). This official, "pro-Russian" paradiplomacy has been analyzed primarily through its special role in Russia's overall international relationsnamely as a bridge to the Middle East, with whom Chechnya has developed close relations (Hallbach 2018;Pietrasiak and Słowikowski 2018;Kosach 2019). Then, some studies analyze the international dimension of the Chechen conflict, focusing on the relevant, overarching geopolitical factors (Avioutskii 2005).…”

Section: Paradiplomacy and The Chechen Casementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The OIC meeting stands out as an example of the coordination between Kadyrov and the Kremlin; it was in that meeting that Putin announced Russia’s intention to join the OIC. The move in general, and the inclusion of Kadyrov in Putin’s delegation in particular, was meant to dissuade the accusations of Islamophobia in Russia and as a driver of the second Chechen campaign (Kosach 2019, 5–7). The visit to the US in 2003 was also planned with a degree of cooperation with the Kremlin (RIA 2003a).…”

Section: Chechnya’s Paradiplomacy 2000–2020mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Chechnya’s Paradiplomacy 2000–2020: The Emergence and Evolution of External Relations of a Reincorporated Territory

Klyszcz

2022

Nationalities Papers

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From the year 2000 on, Chechen official international relations – called “paradiplomacy” – have centered around legitimacy-building, security cooperation and investment attraction, priorities set by the republic’s first official, pro-Russian president, Akhmat Kadyrov (in office 2000–2004). Kadyrov’s successors, Alu Alkhanov (2004–2007) and Ramzan Kadyrov (2007–to date) developed Grozny’s international engagements further, introducing new partners – such as China – and new dimensions to the external action – such as militarization. At each step, Grozny operated between full autonomy and collaboration with Moscow, involving itself in high-level diplomacy and furthering Moscow’s agenda abroad, primarily in the Middle East. In this article, I argue that Chechen paradiplomacy is an instrument for the inclusion of Chechnya into the governance structures of Russia’s federal order. The argument rests on two premises: Chechnya’s paradiplomacy is framed by the Kremlin’s proactive support and coordination, and Chechnya’s paradiplomacy is closely connected to the Kremlin’s security priorities. Since reincorporation, Chechen paradiplomacy has not been an addition to Russian federal relations but an intrinsic part of the post-2000 political arrangement between Grozny and Moscow. To empirically ground this argument, I trace the evolution of Chechen paradiplomacy across the three post-incorporation presidencies, ending in 2020.

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Section: Paradiplomacy and The Chechen Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Chechnya’s Paradiplomacy 2000–2020mentioning

confidence: 99%