Russia’s idea of the multipolar world order: origins and main dimensions

Abstract

Contemporary international relations are rife with the ideological struggle over the potential nature of the rapidly changing world order. Two distinct paradigmatic positions have surfaced. One champions economic, cultural, and political globalization conducted under the leadership of the Western world. The other advocates a more particularistic approach that fends for a balance of interests, multiplicity of politico-cultural forms and multiple centers of international influence. The latter doctrine, often referred to as the multipolar world theory, is the subject of this paper. The discussion argues that the idea of a multipolar world order has emerged as Russia’s main ethical and ideological position advanced in the international arena. Its philosophical tenets buttress Russian society intellectually at home, providing the expedients to pursue the country’s foreign policy goals abroad. The paper examines a substantial value package with roots in both Russian and Western philosophy that sustains the multipolar world order theory

Russlands Wende nach Osten. Kleine Schritte statt umfassende Neuorientierung

“…Eine neue, multipolare Weltordnung sei im Entstehen, so Putin bereits in einem viel beachteten Artikel aus dem Jahr 2012 (Putin 2012 b). In dieser spiele auch Russland eine neue Rolle, je nach Auslegung als eigenständiger, regionaler Machtpol oder aber als Verbindungsglied zwischen Europa und den von China dominierten, asiatischen Regionen (Makarychev und Morozov 2011 ; Chebankova 2017 ). Eingang fand diese Perspektive beispielsweise in die 2013 veröffentliche Konzeption der Außenpolitik Russlands (MFA 2013 ).…”

Russia’s ‘Strategic Narratives’: The Case of Syria and the ‘Arab Spring’

“…Having been denied integration into Western clubs, Russia has not only turned to competitive policies but has also tried to 'develop new, more positive images by contributing to global governance while maintaining distinctive identities' [ also has an influence on domestic society in terms of forging a consensus; one scholar suggests that the strategic narrative which emphasises rivalry with the West 'has a constitutive effect on interests and collective identity among the elite and the public alike, which means the narrative's power is also of the structuring kind' [20, P. 577]. It is worth noting that the Russian Federation Information Security Doctrine of 2016 -as well as counteracting information campaigns for military and political purposes which 'seek to undermine the sovereignty, political and social stability and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, and pose a threat to international peace, global and regional security' -also emphasises the aim of 'neutralizing the information impact intended to erode Russia's traditional moral and spiritual values' [16, P. 221] 3 . Put simply, in seeking to develop a specific Russian model based on unique national traditions widely shared in society, Russia's political elite 'has adopted a strategy of identity management… with the result that Putin now presents Russia as superior to Western nations on a new dimension of comparison, which claims to be oriented toward traditional ethical norms as the criteria for assessment in the international arena' [5, P. 404].…”

“…Russia's approach to the Syria conflict reflects official perceptions about the international order that were prevalent before the onset of the Arab Spring. Official and expert narratives in Russia focus on a number of central challenges facing the country: structural shifts in the global system of states; the increasing use of military power in international relations; divisions among the Western powers, with an unpredictable 3 Text of Russian Federation Information Security Doctrine at http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/ official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2563163 4 Lavrov's address and answers to questions from students and attendees of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, 27.02.2015, at http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/ content/id/971662. 5 Vladimir Putin, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, 12.12.2013, at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/ news/19825.…”

Russia’s Foreign Policy

“…The Westernizers were represented by P. Chaadaev, T. N. Granovsky, V. G. Belinsky, A. I. Herzen, N. P. Ogarev, K. D. Kavelin and Slavophiles by I. Kirievsky, A. Khomyakov, the Aksakov brothers, Yu. Samarin, N. Danilevsky and K. Leontev (Chebankova, 2017). Slavophiles stressed on the Slavic identity based on unique history, Slavic language and religion.…”