Russia's Asymmetric Response to 21st Century Strategic Competition: Robotization of the Armed Forces

Abstract

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin will have to rethink, reform, and rebuild the country's military while facing even more binding financial constraints under a new wave of sanctions and export controls. In this new strategic and economic environment, Russia's political and military leadership likely will have to prioritize some modernization programs and abandon others. Some Russian military strategists have said that the country's military should not match its adversaries' capabilities; instead, it should seek an asymmetric response by developing capabilities that make its adversaries' high-tech weapon systems economically unjustifiable. In recent years, there seemed to be a growing consensus in Russia that using artificial intelligence and robotics-enabling relatively cheap but capable forces-might just be such an asymmetric response. Moreover, in the face of unsatisfactory performance and low morale of the Russian troops in Ukraine, Moscow might see the robotization of the Armed Forces as a way to alleviate its dependence on manpower. However, such a technological shift will be more difficult to achieve under these new financial and technological constraints.In this report, we examine the Russian vision for robotization and highlight where that vision diverges from the robotic revolution in the United States. We analyze Russia's progress in the robotization of its Armed Forces and assess under what conditions could Moscow deliver on its robotization vision. Our findings indicate that, compared with the United States, Russia might be more willing to grant autonomy to military drones and robots when executing strikes and appears to see ground robotic capabilities on par with aerial drones. Moscow believes that unmanned capabilities can replace soldiers (and not just augment them); this is supposed to decrease personnel losses and increase combat effectiveness. Although robotization progress has been slow and the key inputs of the innovation system will be negatively affected by the sanctions and export controls that were imposed on Russia in 2022, the overall emphasis on unmanned capabilities might persist. Consequently, lowering the political and financial costs of Russian foreign deployments could increase those deployments' frequency.The research reported here was completed in October 2021, reviewed and revised in spring 2022 on the basis of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and underwent security review with the sponsor and the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review before public release.