Russia's Arctic Ambitions and Anxieties

Baev, Pavel

doi:10.1525/curh.2013.112.756.265

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…In addition to that, in 2010, Russia – after more than 40 years of standstill in the negotiations – entered into an agreement with Norway over the delineation of the border in the Barents Sea; in which Norway and Russia have divided the area equitably between them ‘in two parts of approximately the same size’ (Government of Norway, 2010). Even though the agreement was not particularly popular in realist/geopolitical circles in Russia – right-wing firebrand Vladimir Zhirinovsky asked rhetorically whether Russia had ‘lost a battle in the war against Norway’ (Rowe & Blakkisrud, 2014, p. 74); Putin, who was Prime Minister at the time, officially distanced himself from the agreement (Baev, 2013, p. 267); and, in the Russian media, it has since been debated what Putin can do to ‘get the Barents Sea back’ (Hønneland, 2014, p. 3) – Medvedev, during a visit to Oslo in April 2010, chose to announce the compromise. And Putin himself, followed by Sergei Shoigu, Sergei Lavrov and Dmitry Medvedev, started to ‘cultivate a discourse pointing up a “dialogue of cultures” in the Arctic’ (Laruelle, 2011).…”

Section: Russia's Arctic Debates Before the War In Ukrainementioning

confidence: 99%

“…First of all, the decision-making process is much more prolonged – by the nature of the subject, of course – and much more institutionalised, and the circle of confidants is much larger, just as the policy to a large extent is written down in public documents. According to several scholars, the presidential administration is the leading institution followed closely by the National Security Council, which has been responsible for the Arctic strategies since 2008, and the Ministry of Defence (Åtland, 2011; Baev, 2013; Berzina, 2015). Nikolai Patrushev, together with the then-Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu, convinced Putin of the importance of the Arctic, Baev argues (Baev, 2012, 2013, p. 270).…”

Section: Who Are the Principle Actors Determining Russia's Arctic Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to several scholars, the presidential administration is the leading institution followed closely by the National Security Council, which has been responsible for the Arctic strategies since 2008, and the Ministry of Defence (Åtland, 2011; Baev, 2013; Berzina, 2015). Nikolai Patrushev, together with the then-Minister of Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu, convinced Putin of the importance of the Arctic, Baev argues (Baev, 2012, 2013, p. 270). Additionally, it is obvious that the Foreign Ministry, at least since 2008–2009, has outlined a large part of the Russian policy regarding the Arctic – within the framework set by the presidential administration and the National Security Council.…”

Section: Who Are the Principle Actors Determining Russia's Arctic Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Russia's strategy in the Arctic: cooperation, not confrontation

Staun¹

2017

Polar Record

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Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding international relations (IR) discourses – or foreign policy directions. On the one hand, there is an IR-realism/geopolitical discourse that puts security first and often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with ‘exploring’, ‘winning’ or ‘conquering’ the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind Russia's national interests in the area. Opposed to this is an IR-liberalism, international law-inspired and modernisation-focused discourse, which puts cooperation first and emphasises ‘respect for international law’, ‘negotiation’ and ‘cooperation’, and labels the Arctic as a ‘territory of dialogue’, arguing that the Arctic states all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully. After a short but very visible media stunt in 2007 and subsequent public debate by proponents of the IR-realism/geopolitical side, the IR-liberalism discourse has been dominating Russian policy in the Arctic since around 2008–2009, following a pragmatic decision by the Kremlin to let the Foreign Ministry and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov take the lead in the Arctic. The question asked here is how solid is this IR-liberalist-dominated Arctic policy? Can it withstand the pressure from more patriotic minded parts of the Russian establishment?

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Section: Russia's Arctic Debates Before the War In Ukrainementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Who Are the Principle Actors Determining Russia's Arctic Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Who Are the Principle Actors Determining Russia's Arctic Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Russia's strategy in the Arctic: cooperation, not confrontation

Staun¹

2017

Polar Record

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“…35 These include civilian nuclear-powered and research icebreakers that can support shipping operations and respond to emergency situations and ice-reinforced vessels to transport cargo along the NSR. 36 Several more commercial ice-breaking assets are in the works, as are cargo ships with their own icebreaking capability, as a sign of future Arctic shipping. 37 Russia is planning to build more icebreakers in the next several years.…”

Section: Russiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Report on the Arctic Capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces

2023

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The Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC), a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) operated by the RAND Corporation, was commissioned to generate a report on the Arctic capabilities of the U.S. armed forces, as directed in Section 8424 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021. This report documents the U.S. armed forces' current and planned Arctic capabilities, as well as other nations'-allies', other partners', and potential rivals'-operating capabilities in the Arctic. We evaluated limitations to U.S. access and presence, including issues related to domain awareness and communications. We also considered how cooperation with federal, international, and commercial entities affects the ability to execute national security missions and priorities where access and presence are a means for doing so.The research was conducted using a mixed-method approach that relied on interviews, capability documentation, computer simulation and data analysis, logic modeling, and a tabletop exercise. The scope was broad in terms of mission and domain, although, in accordance with the fiscal year 2021 NDAA and research sponsor interests, some aspects of this report emphasize the surface maritime domain and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) statutory missions, including defense readiness; ice operations; ports, waterways, and coastal security; search and rescue; law enforcement; and marine environmental protection response activities. The report's expansion beyond the scope requirements of the original NDAA is based on the need to analyze additional areas to address those that were explicitly stated in the NDAA.This research is intended to inform the U.S. Congress and support continued Arctic planning and investments by the USCG and other U.S. armed forces. Information found in this report was current as of May 2022. We acknowledge that the ongoing war in Ukraine at the time of this writing could influence Arctic issues.This research was sponsored by the USCG Office of Requirements and Analysis (CG-771) and conducted in the Infrastructure, Immigration, and Security Operations Program of the RAND Homeland Security Research Division, which operates HSOAC.

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