Russia, China and Central Asia: Cooperation over Competition

China’s Belt and Road Projects in Central Asia

“…At present, Russia faces serious economic problems. It is quite uncertain whether BRI would have a positive or negative impact on Russia's competitiveness in the region (Ishnazarov, 2020;Kazantsev et al, 2021;Sahakyan, 2020). China's greater economic investment and transport corridors built in Central Asia could possibly lead to an increase of mutual energy trade between them and also could possibly harm the Russian economy (Chen & Fazilov, 2018;Mardell, 2020;Melnikovova, 2020).…”

“…China's dominance on both its borders has helped China keep Russian dominance in the region under check. However, China is comfortable with Russian dominance in the region as compared to the Americans (Sahakyan, 2020; regular touch-up and trade connectivity with the CAR is considered necessary for the development and social stability of Xinjiang province since Central Asia is primarily Muslim in origin as are the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. The BRI came into limelight when Central Asia was mired in a fast-changing geopolitical landscape.…”

“…Since Central Asia acts as a gateway for China's diversified land routes to other markets, all of China's overland trade routes connecting Europe and West Asia pass through the CAR, bringing necessary economic development and stability to the region (Russell, 2019;Sahakyan, 2020;Tukmadiyeva, 2013;Yellinek, 2020). As shown in Figure 2, consequently, the Central Asian states have benefited from this with an increase in foreign currency reserves, government finances, large-scale foreign investment and significant domestic development (Mariani, 2013;Sajjanhar, 2021).…”

“…China is interested to promote a peaceful, stable and prosperous Central Asia because unrest in the majority Muslim region could spread extremism and separatist movements to Xinjiang, China’s restive northwest autonomous region (Shah, 2021; Tukmadiyeva, 2013; Zanardi, 2019). Third, China is investing in rail and road projects to create overland alternatives to its sea routes to Europe, the Middle East and other regions, where Beijing exports to and from where it imports energy and other similar key products and commodities (Chatzky & McBride, 2020; Joshi, 2018; Sahakyan, 2020). In this broader scheme of the BRI, Central Asia has emerged as a crucial and valuable region, where this grand connectivity project is viewed as a most important Chinese diplomatic and economic strategy in the region where both Russia and the USA have struggled to maintain a foothold (Chen & Fazilov, 2018; Ishnazarov, 2020; Taliga, 2021).…”

“…On the other hand, the second largest trading partner of the CAR, Russia, was limited to around US$31 billion in the same period (Koparkar, 2017). In September 2019, China's bilateral trade volume with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had reached US$23.7 billion (Bin, 2019;Sahakyan, 2020).…”