Russia as a great power: Status inconsistency and the two Chechen wars

Abstract

The article examines Russia as a great power from the point of view of status inconsistency theory. Applications of the theory to Russia have focused on the status accorded to Russia in diplomatic representation and membership of key international organizations, which suggests that Russia is a ‘status overachiever’ in that it has an international status that is greater than its actual capabilities would warrant. However, this article focuses on Russian perceptions of the country’s status internationally, especially as reflected in the actual experience of membership in international organizations (OSCE, Council of Europe) and relations with the EU in the context of the two Chechen wars. The article demonstrates that, at least according to Russian assessments, Russia is accorded lower status in these organizations than the great power status which most Russians believe should be theirs. While concluding that status inconsistency is a useful tool for explaining Russian foreign policy behavior, the article notes that differing assessments of what Russia’s level of status recognition is pose challenges for status inconsistency theory.

Russia and Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space

“…Accordingly, Russia acts as a spoiler in regional security of the post-Soviet space in order to defend Russia's image of great power and its ancient values such as Slavic Brotherhood and Eurasianism that embody a civilization in its own right opposed to that of the West and the Western system of values (Gould-Davies 2019). The final goal of Russia's foreign policy is to re-establish its great powerness, which vanished with the "loss" of the Coal War (Smith 2014;Urnov 2014). Therefore, Russia's intervention in post-Soviet conflicts have been interpreted according to both Russia's cultural uniqueness (Yanov 2013a, b) and attempts of Russia to obtain great power's status recognition by peer states (Forsberg 2014;Shevchenko 2010, 2014) and to gain a seat at the decision table (Ikenberry 2011).…”

Russia and Europe: Between Integration and Diplomacy

“…The latter problem, or, more precisely, its consequence as the first Chechen war of 1994-1996, was one of the reasons for the delay in the ratification by the european union of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation agreement between Russia, the eu and its member states. The agreement came into force only in 1997, when the strategic lines of development of both Russia and europe had been generally defined (Smith, 2014). Thus, the 1994 agreement came not as a strategic manifesto but a technical document, and both parties perceived it exactly as such.…”

“…This particular circumstance made contradictions between the two parties inevitable and gradually proved ruinous for the capacity of the oSCe and the european Council. little by little, both these institutions have turned into a kind of "battlefield" for Russia's and europe's diplomacy, which as early as the second half of the 2000s largely thwarted their activity (Smith, 2014). however, this did not rule out the parties' consent on individual tactical or technical issues.…”

From status inconsistency to revisionism: Russian foreign policy after color revolutions

“…One major objective of Russia's foreign policy throughout the period after the Soviet collapse was improving or bringing back Russia's international status and eventually being recognized by the Western powers as a great power with the same rights and privileges. In that regard, greatpowerness ( velikoderzhavnost ) like framing the center of Russian state identity plays a critical part in Russian foreign policy (Trenin, 2011; Clunan, 2014; Forsberg, 2014; Heller, 2014; Larson and Shevchenko, 2014; Smith, 2014). This belief had some deep effects on the feeling of national identity, the political attitudes of Russian citizens, and the content of the Russian government's political decisions (Urnov, 2014).…”

“…Some scholars explain the change in Russia's foreign policy regarding the non-rational, emotional, and unpredictable factors that shape the state's policies. Considering the role of status and identity in world politics, constructivists examine Russia's foreign policies to answer the question of variation in its behaviors from cooperation to confrontation (Clunan, 2014; Forsberg et al , 2014; Heller, 2014; Larson and Shevchenko, 2014; Smith, 2014). According to this view, Russia's foreign behaviors are essentially driven by the aspiration to restore and strengthen the great power status.…”