1983
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-17201-6
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Russia and the Origins of the First World War

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Cited by 155 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…The latter sparked off the First Morocco Crisis of 1905. While designed by German policymakers to break up the entente cordiale , it ended up only strengthening the Franco-Russian alliance while laying the first ‘bridge between the Anglo-French Entente and Russia’ (Fischer, 1975: 57; see Lieven, 1983: 29–31).…”
Section: Collapsing Empires and Rising Nationalisms: The ‘Peripheral’ Sources Of Geopolitical Conflict And Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The latter sparked off the First Morocco Crisis of 1905. While designed by German policymakers to break up the entente cordiale , it ended up only strengthening the Franco-Russian alliance while laying the first ‘bridge between the Anglo-French Entente and Russia’ (Fischer, 1975: 57; see Lieven, 1983: 29–31).…”
Section: Collapsing Empires and Rising Nationalisms: The ‘Peripheral’ Sources Of Geopolitical Conflict And Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Specifically, the Russian defeat of 1905 diminished St Petersburg’s ambitions in Central Asia, lessening the threat posed to British colonial interests in the region. The 1904–1907 war-revolution imbroglios also reduced London’s fears of Russian power providing ‘the essential backdrop’ to the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 (Lieven, 1983: 31). Though the issue of British participation in a future war on the side of France became a predominating question within German policymaking circles from then onwards, the Schlieffen Plan — as later altered by the younger Moltke — circumvented any chance of assuring British neutrality as it called for a first-strike offensive against France through Belgium (Gordon, 1974).…”
Section: Collapsing Empires and Rising Nationalisms: The ‘Peripheral’ Sources Of Geopolitical Conflict And Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Having already experienced defeat in both the RussoJapanese War and the 1908-09 Bosnian crisis, Russia did not want to appear weak again. 90 Vigorous Russian support, in turn, strengthened Serbian resolve. 91 As Joll puts it, "[T]he Austrians had believed that vigorous actions against Serbia and a promise of German support would deter Russia: the Russians had believed that a show of strength against Austria would both check the Austrians and deter Germany.…”
Section: Trading On Preconceptions 143mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…P. A. Bark, the minister of finance whose notes provide the key historical record of these deliberations, commented that Krivoshein's arguments not to abandon Russia's Balkan interests were critical to the cabinet's decisions. 91 Because concessions and caution had simply heightened German aggression, Krivoshein argued it was time for Russia to show "that we had come to the end of the concessions we were prepared to make." 92 Perhaps most important, the ongoing economic conflict with Germany contributed to the arguments that Russia was ready to defend its interests with actions that heightened the risk of war.…”
Section: Protecting National Interests? T H E Case Of World W a R Imentioning
confidence: 99%