‘Rule of Law’ initiatives and the liberal peace: the impact of politicised reform in post‐conflict states

Abstract

Strengthening the 'Rule of Law' (RoL) has emerged as a key requirement in the reconstruction of conflict-affected states. No longer simply a philosophical ideal, RoL now exists as a tangible set of policies created and implemented by international actors, to which conflict-affected states are expected to conform. Masked in the neutral, apolitical rhetoric of blind and objective justice, RoL programming is in fact a political tool within the larger liberal peacebuilding project. Its employment as such mutes its potential contribution to constructing a positive peace as it often creates new socio-political tensions and distorts accountability structures. An analysis of reforms in Kosovo under the United Nations administration illustrates the potential for liberal RoL reforms to increase insecurity in the short term and threaten the sustainability of peacebuilding reforms in the long term. Instrumental use of RoL programming thus provides further evidence of weaknesses and contradictions within the politicised liberal peacebuilding project, necessitating reconsideration of its role in post-conflict transformations.

Just How Liberal Is the Liberal Peace?

“…Liberal peace theories argue that social order and justice should be established and maintained by social regulations. 36 Based on the assumption that the establishment of a more peaceful society 'require[s] dedicated support on the broader aspects of peacebuilding strategy, especially in the area of rule of law', 37 the seminal documents commonly pursue the enshrining of all governance activities 'in domestic constitutional documentation and in international treaties at the heart of the new peace' 38 and consider '[a] functioning law and justice system', 'essential for protecting civilians' and 'maintaining social order.' 39 The rule of law has become instrumentalized through statebuilding, governance interventions and a consensus among liberal peace agents that 'institutionalization before liberalization' was a justifiable strategy.…”

‘Global’ norms and ‘local’ agency: frictional peacebuilding in Kosovo

“…This vision is produced by and guaranteed through the establishment of democratic institutions, good governance and rule of law (ICO official, personal interview by author, 17 November, 2011;cf. Gheciu 2005;Peterson 2009;Ernst 2011). The local Kosovo Albanian political elites, on the other hand, strive consistently for international recognition and a 'full-blown Kosovo Albanian nation-state' (Krasniqi 2012: 360).…”

“…The normative framework is depicted as undemocratic or colonial and its 'nice words and big promises' are seen to hide practices of power and domination as well as double standards and hypocrisy. Thus, attempts are made to reject, displace and oust it (Peterson 2009;Zaum 2009;Björkdahl and Gusic 2013). At times, resistance and rejection are accompanied with (re)articulations of alternative norms and (re)inventions of practices that are envisioned to replace global norms and practices.…”

“…Boyle 2010; Ker-Lindsay 2012; Krasniqi 2012). Corruption is widespread, nepotism common, and minorities are discriminated systematically (Peterson 2009). Thus, the co-opting actors instrumentalise global norms to end the external presence, while systematically refusing to adhere to them.…”

The Forum: Dealing with the Aftermath of Political Violence

“…As Lamont’s account of the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo’s and NATO’s role in the former Yugoslavia (home to perhaps the archetypal “humanitarian war”) illustrates, though, this consequentialist position loses some of its moral statue in implementation. In advocating the use of violence, a Benthamite compromise emerged that gave rise to an increasingly intimate relationship between NGOs and military combatants, thereby narrowing the political space in which peace in the Balkans could be pursued (Peterson 2010).…”