Roth–Postlewaite stability and von Neumann–Morgenstern stability

Kawasaki, Ryo

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.02.002

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…For this class of preference profiles, we first show that the core may still be empty; we prove that, by contrast, the set of stable allocations is nonempty and forms a stable set à la von Neumann and Morgenstern. The latter two results rest on the corresponding ones provided by Roth and Postlewaite (1977) and Kawasaki (2015), respectively, for a classical housing market with no externalities.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 71%

“…For the reason expressed by Fact 4, stable allocations have been considered a solution concept in its own right as well as a proper refinement to the core. For classical preference relations, relevant positive results have been provided for such solution notion: first, the set of stable allocations is nonempty when no trader is indifferent between any indivisible goods (Roth & Postlewaite, 1977); moreover, when a suitable dominance relation among allocations is considered, stable allocations form a stable set à la von Neumann–Morgenstern (Kawasaki, 2015). Unfortunately, the former property does not hold in general for our model, as shown by the next fact.…”

Section: Motivating Examples and Preparatory Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The proof grounds on the corresponding result provided by Kawasaki (2015) for a standard housing market model.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Then, we show that the same result as the first class holds true; that is, the set of stable allocations is nonempty and forms the unique stable set for the market. The technique to get the latter result is adapted from that used by Kawasaki (2015) for a standard framework with no externalities.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shapley and Scarf housing markets with consumption externalities

Graziano

Meo

Yannelis

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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We introduce externalities into the classical model by Shapley and Scarf; that is, agents care about others and their preferences are defined over allocations rather than over single indivisible goods. After collecting some results about the nonexistence of several cooperative solutions, we focus on stable allocations and propose domains of preferences that can guarantee that they both exist and form a stable set à la von Neumann and Morgenstern.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 71%

Section: Motivating Examples and Preparatory Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The proof grounds on the corresponding result provided by Kawasaki (2015) for a standard housing market model.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shapley and Scarf housing markets with consumption externalities

Graziano

Meo

Yannelis

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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“…Ma (1994) proved that the TTC mechanism is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality, 11 Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness. 12 Furthermore, the strong-core allocation is "stable" under multiple definitions (Roth and Postlewaite (1977), Wako (1984Wako ( , 1991, Kawasaki (2015)). All things considered, the strong-core allocation is this market's most compelling outcome.…”

Section: Private and Public Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Endowments, Exclusion, and Exchange

Balbuzanov

Kotowski

2019

ECTA

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We propose a new solution for discrete exchange economies and resource-allocation problems, the exclusion core. The exclusion core rests upon a foundational idea in the legal understanding of property, the right to exclude others. By reinterpreting endowments as a distribution of exclusion rights, rather than as bundles of goods, our analysis extends to economies with qualified property rights, joint ownership, and social hierarchies. The exclusion core is characterized by a generalized top trading cycle algorithm in a large class of economies, including those featuring private, public, and mixed ownership. It is neither weaker nor stronger than the strong core.

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