Rosy with Sider? The Case of the Metaphysical Liar

Abstract

An important trend in contemporary metaphysics denies that the structure of natural language is an important datum for investigating fundamental structure. Ted Sider proceeds on this basis to propose a metaphysical semantics for natural language. Within this framework he argues that natural language and a fundamental, 'jointcarving', language could be subject to distinct logics. Developing an argument of Hartry Field's, I show that Sider's preferred option of fundamental classicality combined with non-fundamental non-classicality trivialises within the framework of Siderian metaphysical semantics. The position can be saved only by revising key claims about truth and metaphysical semantics. This has serious implications for methdology in the metaphysics of logic.Keywords Metaphysics of logic · Paradox · Nonclassical logic · Dialetheism · Truth · Sider A familiar thought in contemporary metaphysics is that ordinary thought and language concern themselves with matters other than the fundamental structure of reality. In order to uncover that structure, if -contra Kant -this is possible at all, serious philosophical work is required. In the course of the investigation ordinary language will require regimentation, locutions concerning to non-fundamental structure will be paraphrased away, and vocabulary which does not, in the familiar