Roll a die and tell a lie – What affects honesty?

Arbel, Yuval; Bar-El, Ronen; Siniver, Erez; Tobol, Yossef

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.08.009

Cited by 42 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Arbel et al . () address some of these shortcomings by testing a different type of religious identity (Jewish) with more observations ( n = 205) and both genders (Arbel et al ., ). In line with the previous literature, secular females cheated more than religious females, and the same relation was found for males.…”

Section: Results: Who Cheats?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do We Lie? A Practical Guide to the Dishonesty Literature

Jacobsen

Fosgaard

Pascual‐Ezama

2017

Journal of Economic Surveys

149

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Over the last decade, a massive body of research has been devoted to uncovering human dishonesty. In the present paper, we review more than a hundred papers from this literature and provide a comprehensive overview by first listing the existing theoretical frameworks, and then covering the common empirical approaches, synthesizing the demographic and personal characteristics of those who cheat, identifying the behavioural mechanisms found that affect dishonesty and finally we finish by discussing how the empirical evidence fit theory. Overall, the review concludes that many people behave dishonestly, but also that it is a highly malleable behavior sensitive to elements such as decision contexts, behaviour of others, state of mind and depletion. The review can be used as an overview of the dishonesty literature or as a guide or work of reference for selected topics of interest.

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Section: Results: Who Cheats?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Do We Lie? A Practical Guide to the Dishonesty Literature

Jacobsen

Fosgaard

Pascual‐Ezama

2017

Journal of Economic Surveys

149

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“…This utility depends on the audience's beliefs, via p(x 0 jy); so we have a psychological game in the sense of Geanakoplos et al and Battigalli & Dufwenberg (2009). 6 Note that the utility is independent of x. DM cares about his image, not about cheating per se. We say that (2) captures perceived cheating aversion.…”

Section: Beliefs Utility Solution Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Condition (ii) says that if y is a choice DM may make when using s (in the sense that P x s(x)(y) > 0) then p(x 0 jy) is calculated using Bayes' rule based on correct initial audience beliefs. If y is a choice DM will not make when using s (so that P x s(x)(y) = 0) then no restrictions apply to p(x 0 jy) except that p( 6 We need B&D's framework as GP&S would not allow DM's utility to depend on another's beliefs or on an updated belief; p(x 0 jy) has both features, being the audience's updated belief. The models of Gneezy et al and Khalmetski & Sliwka similarly …t B&D's framework, although their functional forms di¤er from ours.…”

Section: Beliefs Utility Solution Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Dufwenberg

2018

Journal of Economic Theory

120

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well. JEL-Codes: C720, D030, D820, D830, H260. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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“…Motivated by pure aversion to lying, some even disregard potential favorable consequences of lying for themselves or others (López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013). In economic terms, there is an intrinsic cost to lying, which is prohibitively high for some (Arbel et al, 2014;Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). Refuting the idea of a simple distinction between economic and ethical types, Gibson et al (2013) traced honesty back to heterogeneous preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Be Close to Me and I Will Be Honest. How Social Distance Influences Honesty

Hermann

Ostermaier

2018

SSRN Journal

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We conducted a laboratory experiment to examine how honesty depends on social distance. Participants cast dice and reported the outcomes to allocate money between themselves and fellow students or the socially distant experimenter. They could lie about outcomes to earn more money. We found that dishonesty increases with social distance. However, responsiveness to social distance depends on personal preferences about inequity and honesty as a moral value. We observed selfish 'black lies' but not altruistic 'white lies' (outcomes were not understated to reduce inequality). Our results suggest that the reduction of social distance can promote honesty in social interactions.

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Roll a die and tell a lie – What affects honesty?

Cited by 42 publications

References 33 publications

Why Do We Lie? A Practical Guide to the Dishonesty Literature

Why Do We Lie? A Practical Guide to the Dishonesty Literature

Lies in disguise – A theoretical analysis of cheating

Be Close to Me and I Will Be Honest. How Social Distance Influences Honesty

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