Role of Live-Duck Movement Networks in Transmission of Avian Influenza, France, 2016–2017

Guinat, Claire; Durand, Benoı̂t; Vergne, Timothée; Corre, Tifenn; Rautureau, Séverine; Scoizec, Axelle; Lebouquin-Leneveu, Sophie; Guérin, Jean‐Luc; Paul, Mathilde

doi:10.3201/eid2603.190412

Cited by 28 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 30 publications

(41 reference statements)

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“…Within poultry, the transmission occurred largely in a direction away from ducks (anseriformes) to chickens (galliformes), but not from chickens back into ducks ( Figure 6 ). This pattern is consistent with our epidemiological findings above as well as previous studies in wild birds [ 42 ] and other reported 2.3.4.4b poultry outbreaks in Europe which implicated ducks in the local spread [ 43 , 44 ].…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 94%

“…We note the risk of the domestic duck sector as a source of cryptic spread and maintenance after introduction. Our results are consistent with detailed spatial modelling during the 2016–17 HPAI 2.3.4.4b outbreaks in France [ 44 , 47 ], and previous surveillance in Bulgaria during 2008–12 [ 43 ]. Both studies found a major role for duck production systems, particularly foie gras, in the spread of avian influenza in the poultry sector.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 91%

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Regional Transmission and Reassortment of 2.3.4.4b Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Viruses in Bulgarian Poultry 2017/18

Venkatesh

Brouwer

Goujgoulova³

et al. 2020

Viruses

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Between 2017 and 2018, several farms across Bulgaria reported outbreaks of H5 highly-pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses. In this study we used genomic and traditional epidemiological analyses to trace the origin and subsequent spread of these outbreaks within Bulgaria. Both methods indicate two separate incursions, one restricted to the northeastern region of Dobrich, and another largely restricted to Central and Eastern Bulgaria including places such as Plovdiv, Sliven and Stara Zagora, as well as one virus from the Western region of Vidin. Both outbreaks likely originate from different European 2.3.4.4b virus ancestors circulating in 2017. The viruses were likely introduced by wild birds or poultry trade links in 2017 and have continued to circulate, but due to lack of contemporaneous sampling and sequences from wild bird viruses in Bulgaria, the precise route and timing of introduction cannot be determined. Analysis of whole genomes indicates a complete lack of reassortment in all segments but the matrix protein gene (MP), which presents as multiple smaller clusters associated with different European 2.3.4.4b viruses. Ancestral reconstruction of host states of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of viruses involved in the outbreaks suggests that transmission is driven by domestic ducks into galliform poultry. Thus, according to present evidence, we suggest the surveillance of domestic ducks as they are an epidemiologically relevant species for subclinical infection. Monitoring the spread due to movement between farms within regions and links to poultry production systems in European countries can help to predict and prevent future outbreaks. The 2.3.4.4b lineage which caused the largest recorded poultry epidemic in Europe continues to circulate, and the risk of further transmission by wild birds during migration remains.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 94%

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 91%

Regional Transmission and Reassortment of 2.3.4.4b Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Viruses in Bulgarian Poultry 2017/18

Venkatesh

Brouwer

Goujgoulova³

et al. 2020

Viruses

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“…Lessons on evidence-based HPAI virus mitigation strategies can be learned from more common poultry pathogens, such as LPAI viruses and Campylobacter [ 218 ]. In addition, regions have their own production characteristics and require region-specific mitigation strategies (e.g., [ 219 ]). Meanwhile, new poultry farms should not be placed close to other farms, or in/near wild waterbird habitats.…”

Section: Future Directions For Hpai Virus Research and Surveillancmentioning

confidence: 99%

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses at the Wild–Domestic Bird Interface in Europe: Future Directions for Research and Surveillance

Verhagen¹,

Fouchier²,

Lewis

2021

Viruses

172

143

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Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks in wild birds and poultry are no longer a rare phenomenon in Europe. In the past 15 years, HPAI outbreaks—in particular those caused by H5 viruses derived from the A/Goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage that emerged in southeast Asia in 1996—have been occuring with increasing frequency in Europe. Between 2005 and 2020, at least ten HPAI H5 incursions were identified in Europe resulting in mass mortalities among poultry and wild birds. Until 2009, the HPAI H5 virus outbreaks in Europe were caused by HPAI H5N1 clade 2.2 viruses, while from 2014 onwards HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses dominated outbreaks, with abundant genetic reassortments yielding subtypes H5N1, H5N2, H5N3, H5N4, H5N5, H5N6 and H5N8. The majority of HPAI H5 virus detections in wild and domestic birds within Europe coincide with southwest/westward fall migration and large local waterbird aggregations during wintering. In this review we provide an overview of HPAI H5 virus epidemiology, ecology and evolution at the interface between poultry and wild birds based on 15 years of avian influenza virus surveillance in Europe, and assess future directions for HPAI virus research and surveillance, including the integration of whole genome sequencing, host identification and avian ecology into risk-based surveillance and analyses.

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“…For each case farm, one control farm was randomly selected amongst duck farms with the same type of production: rearing (1‐day‐old ducklings reared for around 3 weeks), breeding (1‐day‐ to 3‐week‐old ducks bred for around 9–12 weeks), force‐feeding (12‐week‐old ducks force‐fed for around 12 days) and mixed, (b) located within 10 km of an outbreak to ensure same exposure to H5N8, and (c) which had not reported a H5N8 outbreak between 2016 and 2017 (Figure 1). Note that the type of production gives information on the relative farm sizes: whilst rearing and breeding farms are characterized by flocks of several thousand of ducks, force‐feeding farms are characterized by flocks of several hundred (Guinat et al., 2020).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…H5N8 incursion into the country was attributed to long‐distance flights of infected migratory birds from northern Eurasia (Alarcon et al., 2018; Sims et al., 2017). Then, the first subsequent outbreaks were likely associated with the movement of infected ducks prior to the implementation of movement controls (Guinat et al., 2020). Most of the geographic spread was then linked to local farm‐to‐farm transmission events followed by long‐range jumps in the disease dispersal towards the end, which was likely explained by the reinforcement of control measures (Guinat, Nicolas, et al., 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biosecurity risk factors for highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N8) virus infection in duck farms, France

Guinat

Comin

Kratzer

et al. 2020

Transbound. Emerg. Dis.

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Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses continue to pose a serious threat to the poultry industry and public health by consistently causing emergent outbreaks. In 2014, a novel reassortant virus, HPAI H5N8, emerged and caused large outbreaks in East Asia (Kim et al., 2014). The virus spread intercontinentally and severely hit Europe during winter 2016-2017 (Napp, Majó, Sánchez-Gónzalez, & Vergara-Alert, 2018). The number of reported outbreaks in poultry, the diversity of affected wild birds and the geographic dissemination of the virus far exceeded those combined from all past HPAI outbreaks combined in Europe. With a total of 484 poultry outbreaks within a 4-month period, France was the most severely affected European country (Guinat, Nicolas, et al., 2018). Outbreaks were mainly reported in duck flocks

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Role of Live-Duck Movement Networks in Transmission of Avian Influenza, France, 2016–2017

Cited by 28 publications

References 30 publications

Regional Transmission and Reassortment of 2.3.4.4b Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Viruses in Bulgarian Poultry 2017/18

Regional Transmission and Reassortment of 2.3.4.4b Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Viruses in Bulgarian Poultry 2017/18

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Viruses at the Wild–Domestic Bird Interface in Europe: Future Directions for Research and Surveillance

Biosecurity risk factors for highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N8) virus infection in duck farms, France

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