Role of attention in face encoding.

Reinitz, Mark Tippens; Morrissey, J.F.; Demb, Jonathan B.

doi:10.1037/0278-7393.20.1.161

Cited by 92 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…In fact, our experiment indicates that face recognition is generally more accurate when responses are based on features rather than on familiarity. Other experiments have similarly indicated important roles of facial features in face recognition (e.g., Megreya & Burton, 2006;Reinitz, Morrissey, & Demb, 1994); our results are consistent with their findings. Finally, it is important to note that we did not specifically ask subjects which features they recognized.…”

Section: Implications For Theories Of Face Recognitionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Confidence–accuracy relations for faces and scenes: Roles of features and familiarity

et al. 2012

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Using naturalistic scenes, we recently demonstrated that confidence-accuracy relations differ depending on whether recognition responses are based on memory for a specific feature or instead on general familiarity: When confidence is controlled for, accuracy is higher for familiarity-based than for feature-based responses. In the present experiment, we show that these results generalize to face recognition. Subjects studied photographs of scenes and faces presented for varying brief durations and received a recognition test on which they (1) indicated whether each picture was old or new, (2) rated their confidence in their response, and (3) indicated whether their response was based on memory for a feature or on general familiarity. For both stimulus types, subjects were more accurate and more confident for their feature-based than for their familiarity-based responses. However, when confidence was held constant, accuracy was higher for familiaritybased than for feature-based responses. These results demonstrate an important similarity between face and scene recognition and show that for both types of stimuli, confidence and accuracy are based on different information.Keywords Human memory . Face recognition . Recollection . FamiliarityAlthough confidence and accuracy tend to be correlated in recognition memory experiments, the relation is far from perfect. One reason why confidence is not always a good predictor of accuracy is that confidence and accuracy are not always based on the same underlying information. For instance, there is good evidence that metacognitive assumptions sometimes influence confidence in ways that are unrelated to accuracy; for instance, Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, and Loftus (2000) found that increasing the luminance of test items in a recognition experiment produced an increase in recognition confidence but no corresponding accuracy increase. The likely reason is that increasing luminance caused the items to become more salient, and subjects assumed that salient items were more likely to be correctly remembered.Reinitz, Peria, Séguin, and Loftus (2011) specifically tested the proposal that accuracy and confidence are based in part on different underlying informational components. Many previous studies have shown that recognition responses are sometimes based on memory for a visual feature, and sometimes on general familiarity. Featurebased responses tend to be more accurate that familiaritybased responses (e.g., Loftus & Bell, 1975;Loftus & Kallman, 1979;Yonelinas, 2002); however, none of these earlier authors measured recognition confidence. Using naturalistic scenes, Reinitz et al. (2011) Psychon Bull Rev (2012) 19:1085-1093 which, in turn, allowed us to produce confidence-accuracy scatterplots, with one point corresponding to each of the 12 response type-duration conditions. Figure 1 includes an example of such a plot, using the natural-scene data from Reinitz et al. (2011). As with all other graphs in this article, up-facing, solid triangles indicate feature-based respons...

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Section: Implications For Theories Of Face Recognitionsupporting

confidence: 93%

Confidence–accuracy relations for faces and scenes: Roles of features and familiarity

et al. 2012

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“…Recognition of the old faces was greater than recognition of the conjunction faces, which in turn was higher than recognition of the feature faces, which itself was slightly greater than recognition of the new faces. These findings were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that featural and configural information are coded independently, and that configural information requires greater attention than featural information does (e.g., Reinitz, Morrissey, & Demb, 1994). Further studies showed that inversion impairs the old face/conjunction face distinction, because these types of faces are distinguished not by the features that appear in the first stage of the experiment, but by the configuralholistic relations (e.g., Bartlett et al, 2003;McKone & Peh, 2006).…”

Section: A Holistic or Differential Effectmentioning

confidence: 65%

Explaining the face-inversion effect: the face–scheme incompatibility (FSI) model

Rakover

2013

Psychon Bull Rev

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The face-inversion effect (FIE) can be viewed as being based on two kinds of findings. According to the face (UI) effect, perception and recognition are better for faces presented upright (U) than for faces presented inverted (I). According to the face/object(UI) effect, inversion impairs the processing of faces more than the processing of nonfacial objects (e.g., buildings or cars). Part I of this article focuses on the face(UI) effect and the configural-processing hypothesis, which is considered the most popular explanatory hypothesis of the FIE. In this hypothesis, it is proposed that inversion impairs the processing of configural information (the spatial relations between features) but hardly (if at all) impairs the processing of featural information (e.g., eyes, nose, and mouth). Part II of the article starts from the conclusion reached in part I, that the configural-processing hypothesis has not succeeded in explaining a substantial number of the findings and in resolving certain theoretical problems. The part then goes on to outline a new alternative model, the face-scheme incompatibility (FSI) model, which contends with these theoretical problems, accounts for the configural-processing hypothesis, succeeds in explaining a considerable portion of the empirical findings related to the face(UI) effect, and proposes a relatively new research program on the concept of the face scheme. The basic assumption of the FSI model is that schemes and prototypes are involved in processing a visual stimulus of a face and in transforming it to a "meaning-bearing" face, and that different schemes are involved if the face is presented upright or inverted.

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“…We can thus ask whether we form bound memory representation out of perceptually distinct features. This is a different approach than that taken in the existing literature on holistic representations of real-world objects; for example, some evidence suggests that faces are represented holistically as integral units rather than as bound but ultimately independent features of eyes, noses, and mouths (e.g., Tanaka & Farah, 1993; although see Reinitz, Morrissey, & Demb, 1994, for evidence that holistic face encoding is may depend on attention at encoding).…”

Section: Binding and Perceptual Integralitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Real-world objects are not represented as bound units: Independent forgetting of different object details from visual memory.

Brady¹,

Konkle²,

Alvarez³

et al. 2013

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

118

222

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Are real-world objects represented as bound units? Although a great deal of research has examined binding between the feature dimensions of simple shapes, little work has examined whether the featural properties of real-world objects are stored in a single unitary object representation. In a first experiment, we found that information about an object's color is forgotten more rapidly than the information about an object's state (e.g., open, closed), suggesting that observers do not forget objects as entirely bound units. In a second and third experiment, we examined whether state and exemplar information are forgotten separately or together. If these properties are forgotten separately, the probability of getting one feature correct should be independent of whether the other feature was correct. We found that after a short delay, observers frequently remember both state and exemplar information about the same objects, but after a longer delay, memory for the two properties becomes independent. This indicates that information about object state and exemplar are forgotten separately over time. We thus conclude that real-world objects are not represented in a single unitary representation in visual memory.

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Role of attention in face encoding.

Cited by 92 publications

References 36 publications

Confidence–accuracy relations for faces and scenes: Roles of features and familiarity

Confidence–accuracy relations for faces and scenes: Roles of features and familiarity

Explaining the face-inversion effect: the face–scheme incompatibility (FSI) model

Real-world objects are not represented as bound units: Independent forgetting of different object details from visual memory.

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