Role Clarity, Swift Trust and Multi‐Agency Coordination

Curnin, Steven; Owen, Christine; Paton, Douglas; Trist, Cain; Parsons, David

doi:10.1111/1468-5973.12072

Cited by 87 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Although the network of positions is strictly organized, the fleeting nature of accountability in real time operations has some parallels to "swift trust" in temporary groups (Meyerson et al 1996;Curnin et al 2015). This form of trust relies heavily on role clarity among the involved parties.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability on the Fly - Accounting for Trouble in Space Operations

Almklov

Halvorsen

Johansen

2020

Comput Supported Coop Work

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The International Space Station (ISS) is research infrastructure enabling experiments in a microgravity environment. Building on a study of one of the ground control rooms in the ISS network, this paper concentrates on low-level operators and their efforts to display accountability in situations of trouble and problem solving. While the research infrastructure around the ISS is permeated by structural (bureaucratic) approaches to accountability (routines, procedures, audits and verifications), we discuss how real-time operations require a more dynamic form of continuously (re-)established accountability in the network of operators. In time-critical situations, operators need to establish accountability 'on the fly' in order to achieve the necessary agency to operate and troubleshoot their system. One key resource for this is the established voice loop system for synchronous communication. With significant constraints on the form and content of speaking turns, operators need to provide appropriate and recognizable accounts that align with the needs and expectations of the network. Based on an extensive multi-method study, with a focus here on recordings of voice loop interactions, we show how accounts of trouble are designed to manage uncertainty in the larger network, while also positioning the operators as competent and reliable members of the network. Conversely, inadequate accounts create uncertainty and delayed resolution of the issue. The design of accounts on the voice loop is crucial for time-critical articulation work in a distributed collaborative setting. The interactional details on the voice loop provide insights into the production and display of accountability, particularly relevant in networked organizations in which personal relations and trust can only play a marginal role and in which temporal constraints are critical. While the research literature has explored a wide variety of dimensions related to coordination and improvisation in distributed, mediated work environments, this study contributes with insights into the functions of verbal accounts in such contexts and how they may serve to supplement formal systems of accountability.7 See the discussion of anticipation in Patterson et al. (1999) and Rosness et al. (2016) prospective sensemaking for other takes on this. 8 The seamless way that anticipation and remediating measures for possible problems are distributed among hardware, software, scripts, procedures and training is the reason we stress that anticipatory work is sociotechnical, and that it goes far beyond anticipation as a cognitive process.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accountability on the Fly - Accounting for Trouble in Space Operations

Almklov

Halvorsen

Johansen

2020

Comput Supported Coop Work

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“…Cultural conflicts between organizations pose a major challenge to multi-agency cooperation (Ranade and Hudson 2003, Atkinson et al 2005, Curnin et al 2015. To explain how cultures can influence societal safety and security, we view culture as having three elements: 1) language; 2) beliefs, values, and knowledge; and 3) norms and sanctions (Schiefloe 2003).…”

Section: Institutional Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The strong principle of accountability encourages siloed thinking and thus propagates existing turf wars and hinders cross-sectorial cooperation. Moreover, the empirical study suggests that the MJ's culture is characterized by excessive introspection, which increases the propensity for examining its own activities without using its competence to improve the organization at the lower levels.Cultural conflicts between organizations pose a major challenge to multi-agency cooperation (Ranade and Hudson 2003, Atkinson et al 2005, Curnin et al 2015. To explain how cultures can influence societal safety and security, we view culture as having three elements: 1) language; 2) beliefs, values, and knowledge; and 3) norms and sanctions (Schiefloe 2003 Due to the difficulty inherent in decision-making, politicians tend to muddle through decisions by recycling old solutions and adjusting them to suit their preferences (Brunsson 1989;Lindblom 1959) or by applying the same solutions to problems that are by nature different (March and Olson 1983, Rosness 2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

Changes in Norway’s societal safety and security measures following the 2011 Oslo terror attacks

Nilsen

Albrechtsen

Nyheim³

2018

Safety Science

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This paper characterizes changes in Norway's civil protection and emergency preparedness five years after the Oslo and Utøya terror attacks. Data from 48 interviews conducted in the period 2014 to 2016 with civil servants within different levels of the justice sector were qualitatively analyzed. The inductive analysis shows four main changes made related to Norway's civil protection and emergency preparedness within the Ministry of Justice and Public Security: 1) a change in risk perception regarding awareness of security-related risks; 2) the generation of several plans and measures; 3) structural changes at various levels within the justice sector; and 4) increased resources allocated to societal safety and security. The changes following the Oslo terror attacks were not solely in response to the terror attacks, but also the result of previous and subsequent events and reports. The current organization of public administration, however, still fosters siloed thinking and turf wars around the principle of responsibility and each sector's respective area of expertise. Most of the implemented changes can be characterized as structural; diagnoses made after the terror attacks pointed at cultural aspects. IntroductionIn the post-war era, Norway has been fortunate in facing only a handful of large-scale crises and terror-related events (Rykkja, Laegreid et al. 2011). As a result, a fairly untroubled society has been able to attend primarily to the welfare of its inhabitants (Kuhnle 2000, Wollebaek et al. 2012). On July 22, 2011, the nation was shocked when an armed right-wing extremist single-handedly bombed the Government Complex in Oslo and thereafter shot young political aspirants attending a youth camp on the island of Utøya. In total, 77 people were killed during these terror attacks.The aftermath of disasters and national crises represent an opportune time to examine governmental strategies for civil protection and emergency preparedness (Birkmann, Buckle et al. 2010). They provide a moment for self-reflection and a chance to learn from previous mistakes and weaknesses in the governmental system. Changes are usually implemented to demonstrate handling capacity or rectify specific gaps in the system (March and Olson 1983). Lessons learned are ideally applied to a broad context, where the knowledge gained is used to address not only the specific problem but also other issues that may arise from these inadequacies.Nevertheless, in these situations, society also often shows an inclination toward morality plays and blame games (Boin, Hart et al. 2006). A focusing event, such as a terror attack, often leads to excessive fixation on solving the specific problem brought to light by the event (Birkland 2006). Leaders feel pressured to take charge and prevent a similar crisis, and they risk overreacting by way of regulation or other actions and measures in response to the event (de Ridder and Reinders 2014, van Tol 2016). This spontaneous reaction is in part due to media coverage or "mediazation" (Helsloot, Boi...

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“…While D‐day represents an extreme example, like analogies are appealed to in everyday circumstances and research on civilian emergency services (Curnin, Owen, Paton, Trist, & Parsons, : 31). This repeated insight raises questions about the nature of the chaos, its implications for management and how those involved coped.…”

Section: Normal Chaosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Normal chaos: A new research paradigm for understanding practice

Lauder

Marynissen

2017

Contingencies & Crisis Mgmt

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Our key point is this: if practitioners always have to work in imperfect ways with imperfect tools, with imperfect understanding using imperfect information and within imperfect systems where the degree of control available is limited, how do they cope, managerially (i.e., “deal effectively” with the issues before them)? As researchers, we believe the answer to that question is not known and, accordingly, we recommend a new research paradigm for understanding practice more generally. We call that paradigm normal chaos.

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Role Clarity, Swift Trust and Multi‐Agency Coordination

Cited by 87 publications

References 34 publications

Accountability on the Fly - Accounting for Trouble in Space Operations

Accountability on the Fly - Accounting for Trouble in Space Operations

Changes in Norway’s societal safety and security measures following the 2011 Oslo terror attacks

Normal chaos: A new research paradigm for understanding practice

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