Robustness of Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules

Gawron, Grzegorz; Faliszewski, Piotr

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-31489-7_2

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Later, Yang [64] studied the destructive counterparts of these problems. Faliszewski, Gawron, and Kusek [25], and Gawron and Faliszewski [31] studied the robustness of ABMV rules, which can be considered as variants of bribery problems. Markakis and Papasotiropoulos [46] studied control under conditional approval voting.…”

Section: Related Work and Our Main Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complexity of Manipulating and Controlling Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting

Yang

2019

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Section: Related Work and Our Main Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complexity of Manipulating and Controlling Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting

Yang

2019

Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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“…Based on this fact, the problem of data collection can be turned into electing directly an optimal subset of sensor nodes (i.e., the optimal set of rendezvous points) as the solution, and thus, the delay constraint will be implicitly considered. To this end, we proposed a multiwinner voting-(MV-) [17,18] based algorithm for energy-efficient rendezvous selection. The multiwinner voting is aimed at electing multiple satisfying winners (i.e., optimal rendezvous points) from given candidates (i.e., all sensor nodes).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiwinner Voting for Energy-Efficient Mobile Sink Rendezvous Selection in Wireless Sensor Network

Chen

Zhong³

et al. 2022

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

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Recent studies have demonstrated the advantage of applying mobile sink to prevent the energy-hole problem and prolong network lifetime in wireless sensor network. However, most researches treat the touring length constraint simply as the termination indicator of rendezvous point selection, which leads to a suboptimal solution. In this paper, we notice that the optimal set of rendezvous points is unknown but deterministic and propose to elect the set of rendezvous points directly with the multiwinner voting-based method instead of step-by-step selection. A weighted heuristic voter generation method is introduced to choose the representative voters, and a scoring rule is also well designed to obtain a satisfying solution. We also employ an iterative schema for the voting score update to refine the solution. We have conducted extensive experiments, and the results show that the proposed method can effectively prolong the network lifetime and achieve the competitive performance with other SOTA methods. Compared to the methods based on step-by-step selection, the proposed method increases the network lifetime by 23.2% and 10.5% on average under the balanced-distribution and unbalanced-distribution scenarios, respectively.

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“…Analyzing the robustness of outcomes of decision processes has become more and more popular in algorithmic game theory over recent years [2,6,8,15,19,23,24,27]. For instance, in the context of hedonic games, Igarashi et al [16] studied stable outcomes that remain stable even after some agents have been deleted and, in the context of stable matching, Mai and Vazirani [20,21] and Chen et al [11] studied stable matchings that remain stable even if the agents' preferences partly change.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibria in Schelling Games: Computational Hardness and Robustness

Kreisel¹,

Boehmer²,

Froese³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs, agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph such as to maximize the fraction of agents of their type in their occupied neighborhood. Two ways of modeling agent movement here are either to allow two agents to swap their vertices or to allow an agent to jump to a free vertex.The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we prove that deciding the existence of a swap-equilibrium and a jump-equilibrium in this simplest model of Schelling games is NP-hard, thereby answering questions left open by Agarwal et al. [AAAI '20] and Elkind et al. [IJCAI '19]. Second, we introduce a measure for the robustness of equilibria in Schelling games in terms of the minimum number of edges that need to be deleted to make an equilibrium unstable. We prove tight lower and upper bounds on the robustness of swapequilibria in Schelling games on different graph classes. * Supported by DFG project MaMu (NI 369/19).

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Robustness of Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules

Cited by 8 publications

References 21 publications

Complexity of Manipulating and Controlling Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting

Complexity of Manipulating and Controlling Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting

Multiwinner Voting for Energy-Efficient Mobile Sink Rendezvous Selection in Wireless Sensor Network

Equilibria in Schelling Games: Computational Hardness and Robustness

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