Robustness assessment of cyber–physical systems with weak interdependency

Tu, Haicheng; Xia, Yongxiang; Wu, Jiajing; Zhou, Xiang

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2019.01.137

Cited by 52 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Network types Load Metrics Models Network types Load Metrics [7] supply chain networks degree [14] WSNs betweenness [8] electricity grids simulated current [15] WSNs degree [9] communication networks betweenness [16] WSNs betweenness [10] interdependent networks betweenness [17] WSNs exponential degree [11] transmission networks betweenness [18] WSNs betweenness [12] cyber-physical systems betweenness [19] WSNs cluster degree [13] transportation networks degree [20] WSNs number of messages electricity grids based on the alternating current model. Ren et al [9] proposed a stochastic model to study the cascading dynamics in communication networks and identified the vital nodes from the perspective of network invulnerability.…”

Section: Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Wu et al [11] analyzed the impacts of link capacity on the cascading process in general transmission networks and found that a bifurcation point may exist in some cases which divides regions of opposite robustness behavior. Tu et al [12] investigated the cascading invulnerability of cyberphysical systems and observed that two coupling networks have different sensitivity to the failure propagated from the other network. Candelieri et al [13] investigated the cascading invulnerability of public transportation networks against directed attacks.…”

Section: Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sink‐Convergence Cascading Model for Wireless Sensor Networks with Different Load‐Redistribution Schemes

Yao

Yang

2019

Complexity

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Existing cascading models are unable to depict the sink-convergence characteristic of WSNs (wireless sensor networks). In this work, we build a more realistic cascading model for WSNs, in which two load-redistribution schemes (i.e., idle redistribution and even redistribution) are introduced. In addition, failed nodes are allowed to recover after a certain time delay rather than being deleted from the network permanently. Simulation results show that the network invulnerability is positively correlated to the tolerance coefficient and negatively correlated to the exponential coefficient. Under the idle-redistribution scheme, the network can have stronger invulnerability against cascading failures. The extension of the recovery time will exacerbate the fluctuation of the cascading process.

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Section: Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sink‐Convergence Cascading Model for Wireless Sensor Networks with Different Load‐Redistribution Schemes

Yao

Yang

2019

Complexity

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“…Overloading failure will prevent the transmission of data package information and lead to a decrease in the efficiency of the cyber supply network [ 11 ]. The overload phenomenon implies that data flow exceeds the node’s capacity in the cyber supply network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The robustness of the cyber-physical supply network is usually defined as the relative size of the firms that survive the cascading failures [ 11 ]. Our goal was to construct a cascading failure model that can quantify the robustness of the cyber-physical supply network to provide a scientific basis for the development of network protection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robustness of Cyber-Physical Supply Networks in Cascading Failures

Yue

Ren

2021

Entropy

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A cyber-physical supply network is composed of an undirected cyber supply network and a directed physical supply network. Such interdependence among firms increases efficiency but creates more vulnerabilities. The adverse effects of any failure can be amplified and propagated throughout the network. This paper aimed at investigating the robustness of the cyber-physical supply network against cascading failures. Considering that the cascading failure is triggered by overloading in the cyber supply network and is provoked by underload in the physical supply network, a realistic cascading model for cyber-physical supply networks is proposed. We conducted a numerical simulation under cyber node and physical node failure with varying parameters. The simulation results demonstrated that there are critical thresholds for both firm’s capacities, which can determine whether capacity expansion is helpful; there is also a cascade window for network load distribution, which can determine the cascading failures occurrence and scale. Our work may be beneficial for developing cascade control and defense strategies in cyber-physical supply networks.

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“…Modern power systems are thus cyber-physical power systems (CPPS). Although the coupling of these two networks brings some convenience, the power system is more vulnerable to intricate cyber environment, which puts the CPPS at the risk of cyber attacks [1], [2]. In general, external attacks on CPPS can be divided into physical attacks, cyber attacks and cyberphysical attacks (also called coordinated attacks).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems

Xia

Tse

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

Self Cite

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Over the past decade, the cyber security of power systems has been widely studied. Most previous studies have focused on cyber physical attacks, and barely considered one typical cyber attack: availability attack. We propose a hybrid attack model and apply conventional state estimation processes to study cyber attacks on power grids in this paper. The proposed model considers both integrity attack and availability attack simultaneously. Compared with the particular attack, namely, false data injected attack, we analyze their consequences to power systems in the events of false negatives attack and false alarm attack. The results show that the hybrid attack can confuse the control center by manipulating the integrity and availability of measurements. More importantly, we evaluate the hybrid attack with different values of the cost ratio between integrity and availability attacks, and then verify that the hybrid attack can achieve the same goal with a reduced cost. INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical power system, cyber security, attack cost, differential evolution algorithm.

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Robustness assessment of cyber–physical systems with weak interdependency

Cited by 52 publications

References 25 publications

Sink‐Convergence Cascading Model for Wireless Sensor Networks with Different Load‐Redistribution Schemes

Sink‐Convergence Cascading Model for Wireless Sensor Networks with Different Load‐Redistribution Schemes

Robustness of Cyber-Physical Supply Networks in Cascading Failures

A Hybrid Cyber Attack Model for Cyber-Physical Power Systems

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