Robust Peacekeeping Mandates

Abstract

The chapter examines the connection between some recent robust mandates and jus post bellum, based on missions operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and South Sudan. In the framework of robust mandates, peacekeepers’ main responsibilities are to protect civilians and support the local central government in regaining full control over its territory. The author discusses the pros and cons of robust mandates to reach a just and stable post-conflict arrangement. He argues that some recent robust mandates can have some immediate positive effects, but also may make respect for post bellum principles more problematic in the long term. Their contribution to just peace is questionable and requires further study.

The End of the Liberal World Order and the Future of UN Peace Operations: Lessons Learned

“…Our examination of UN peace interventions, both concluded and ongoing, reveals trends that clearly favour robustness over time (Koops et al., 2017; Longobardo, 2020; UN Gilder, 2019; UN Peacekeeping, 2021). In the early years of UN operations (1948–1988), all but one of the missions could be classified as peacekeeping, or missions in which the UN acted as a ‘peaceful third party’ operating with the consent of the parties, impartiality and ‘the non‐use of force except in self defense’ 6.…”

“…Since 2000, 13 of the 18 new UN peace interventions have had Chapter VII mandates 14. , an additional two missions intrastate peacebuilding 15. , and just three of the 18 new missions maintaining a peacekeeping mandate. 16. The point is that in surveying UN peace interventions according to timelines that align with shifts in global hegemony the related shifts in counter-hegemony or conflict are apparent (Chin and Mittelman, 1997;, as are the ways in which the UN has adapted its operational response to undertake broader functions and increased robustness (Longobardo, 2020). Some scholars project a further increase in use of force parameters in line with the more 'direct' action, 'stabilization' mandates in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo 17.…”