Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks

Feldman, Michal; Lai, Kevin; Stoica, Ion; Chuang, John

doi:10.1145/988772.988788

Cited by 446 publications

(355 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…In general, a longer chain implies a greater risk of encountering a malicious "link." Some schemes weigh ratings of a transitive chain by the reputation of the least reputed peer in the chain [17] or proportionally weigh down ratings as the length of the chain increases [7]. EigenTrust, a mechanism similar to PageRank [41], uses a distributed algorithm where global trust values are an aggregation of local trust values weighed by the reputation rating of the raters [28].…”

Section: Dishonest Raters and Dynamic Personalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A free-riding peer conserves bandwidth and CPU by not contributing any resources to the system. Various incentive schemes have been proposed to encourage cooperation and participation in the network [17,18]. One proven way for a system to deal with high churn is to distrust all newcomers in the system [19].…”

Section: Dishonest Raters and Dynamic Personalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, with such a mechanism, legitimate newcomers are treated poorly initially, at least until they build a positive reputation. Feldman et al suggest a "stranger adaptive" strategy to counter whitewashing in a network [17]. Using recent transactions with strangers, a peer estimates the probability of being cheated by the next stranger, and decides whether to trust the next stranger using that probability.…”

Section: Dishonest Raters and Dynamic Personalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The design of a reliable reputation system

Swamynathan

Almeroth

Zhao

2010

Electron Commer Res

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Next generation Web 2.0 communities and distributed P2P systems rely on the cooperation of diverse user populations spread across numerous administrative and security domains. Zero accountability via anonymous online identities and divergent interests result in selfish behavior that can disrupt or manipulate networks for personal gain. While "reputation systems" are recognized as a promising means to establish social control for such communities, developing reliable reputation systems remains a challenge. Several unaddressed threats still limit the effectiveness of reputation systems. Furthermore, most existing work on reputations has focused on accurate reputations for stable systems, but not examined the implications of integrating user reputations into scalable distributed infrastructures. The primary goal of this paper is to investigate and address the critical open challenges that limit the effectiveness of reputations. First, we identify a thorough taxonomy on reputation management, and use it as our framework to classify adversarial threats that compromise reliable operation of reputation systems. Second, we survey existing research to address these threats. Finally, we present our solutions to address the two leading reasons for erroneous and misleading values produced by reputation systems today, i.e., user collusion and short-lived online identities. We believe that this paper not only serves as an introduction to reputation systems design, but will also help researchers deploy reliable reputation solutions that contribute towards improving the performance of large distributed applications.

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Section: Dishonest Raters and Dynamic Personalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Dishonest Raters and Dynamic Personalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Dishonest Raters and Dynamic Personalitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The design of a reliable reputation system

Swamynathan

Almeroth

Zhao

2010

Electron Commer Res

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“…GPD is a two-person game which specifies the general forms for an asymmetric payoff matrix that preserves the social dilemma [3]. GPD is compatible with client/server structure where one player is the client and the other one is the server in each game.…”

Section: Games: Ipd and Gpdmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Impact of Witness-Based Collusion in Agent Societies

Salehi‐Abari

White

2009

Principles of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems

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Abstract. In ways analogous to humans, autonomous agents require trust and reputation concepts in order to identify communities of agents with which to interact reliably. This paper defines a class of attacks called witness-based collusion attacks designed to exploit trust and reputation models. Empirical results demonstrate that unidimensional trust models are vulnerable to witness-based collusion attacks in ways independent multidimensional trust models are not. This paper analyzes the impact of the proportion of witness-based colluding agents on the society. Furthermore, it demonstrates that here is a need for witness interaction trust to detect colluding agents in addition to the need for direct interaction trust to detect malicious agents. By proposing a set of policies, the paper demonstrates how learning agents can decrease the level of encounter risk in a witness-based collusive society.

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“…As in [4], our simulation consists of rounds. Each round is a logical time unit in which every peer plays two roles.…”

Section: A Simulation Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Improve peer cooperation using social networks

Ponce

2009

International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Sys

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Abstract-Due to the dynamic nature of P2P systems, it is impossible to keep an accurate history of the transactions that take place while avoiding security attacks such as whitewashing and collusion, and abuse such as freeriding. This is why it is important to develop a mechanism that both rewards cooperative peers and punishes misbehaving peers. Modelling P2P networks as social structures can allow incentive mechanisms to be developed that prevent the negative behaviors mentioned. In a social structure, peers make and receive payments for services provided to and from each other. In this paper we extend a social network algorithm to include the transfer of credit between peers to reduce the path length in queries. We also develop a selection strategy that involves different aspects of peer interactions in a P2P network and a credit transfer mechanism that helps to dis-incent misbehaving peers by taking away credits that they have with good peers and transferring them to more cooperative ones. The simulation results show that our algorithm is effective in reducing the amount of debt between peers, meaning that peers become more cooperative, and shortening the average path length to a satisfied query, while increasing delivery ratio.

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Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer networks

Cited by 446 publications

References 26 publications

The design of a reliable reputation system

The design of a reliable reputation system

On the Impact of Witness-Based Collusion in Agent Societies

Improve peer cooperation using social networks

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