2017
DOI: 10.1103/physreva.95.052302
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Robust continuous-variable quantum key distribution against practical attacks

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Cited by 27 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…However, the transfer of LO will open some loopholes for eavesdroppers. The loopholes can be exploited to conduct some attacks such as wavelength attacks, saturation attacks, and LO fluctuation attack [32][33][34].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the transfer of LO will open some loopholes for eavesdroppers. The loopholes can be exploited to conduct some attacks such as wavelength attacks, saturation attacks, and LO fluctuation attack [32][33][34].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The practical security analysis of CV-QKD has also begun to gain attention in recent years. Intercept-resent attack [16,17], calibration attack [18,19], local oscillator intensity attack [20], saturation attack [21], and wavelength attack [22,23] are more attractive. The quantum channel is a portal that eavesdroppers can use (see in Figure 1).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The LO transmitted in the insecure quantum channel is most likely to be controlled and manipulated by eavesdroppers who may cause practical attacks on GMCS-CVQKD system, such as the LO fluctuation attack [7], the wavelength attack [8] and the saturation attack [9]. Although some solutions have been proposed to enhance the security of practical systems [10] [11] [12] [13], it is difficult to protect practical systems against all the potential loopholes caused by the LO transmission have been discovered.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%