ROBin: Known-Plaintext Attack Resistant Orthogonal Blinding via Channel Randomization

Pan, Yanjun; Zheng, Yao; Li, Ming

doi:10.1109/infocom41043.2020.9155439

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Each multipath channel consisted of one LoS path and two NLoS paths produced by two randomly placed scatters within the setup area. We used the profile data of a customized RA that was designed for channel randomization purpose in [23]. The RA has 360 antenna modes, achieved by rotating a log-periodic antenna by one degree.…”

Section: Evaluation Of Security Metricsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Apart from key generation protocols, for PHY-layer secret communication in general, Haitham et al [11] defend against multiantenna eavesdroppers in RFID communication, by rotating eight directional antennas equipped at the transmitter's side using a fan motor and randomly selecting the antennas. Pan et al proposed ROBin [22] to enhance the security of orthogonal-blinding based secret communication against known-plaintext attacks by multiantenna eavesdroppers, also by varying the channel state with rotating directional antennas. To defend against signal cancellation attacks (or correlated jamming) and protect message integrity, Pan et al [21] combine ON-OFF keying modulation with channel randomization via a reconfigurable antenna.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Man-in-the-Middle Attack Resistant Secret Key Generation via Channel Randomization

Pan

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Symposium on Theory, Algorithmic Foundations, and Protocol Design for Mobile Net

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Physical-layer based key generation schemes exploit the channel reciprocity for secret key extraction, which can achieve informationtheoretic secrecy against eavesdroppers. Such methods, although practical, have been shown to be vulnerable against man-in-themiddle (MitM) attacks, where an active adversary, Mallory, can influence and infer part of the secret key generated between Alice and Bob by injecting her own packet upon observing highly correlated channel/RSS measurements from Alice and Bob. As all the channels remain stable within the channel coherence time, Mallory's injected packets cause Alice and Bob to measure similar RSS, which allows Mallory to successfully predict the derived key bits. To defend against such a MitM attack, we propose to utilize a reconfigurable antenna at one of the legitimate transceivers to proactively randomize the channel state across different channel probing rounds. The randomization of the antenna mode at every probing round breaks the temporal correlation of the channels from the adversary to the legitimate devices, while preserving the reciprocity of the channel between the latter. This prevents key injection from the adversary without affecting Alice and Bob's ability to measure common randomness. We theoretically analyze the security of the protocol and conduct extensive simulations and real-world experiments to evaluate its performance. Our results show that our approach eliminates the advantage of an active MitM attack by driving down the probability of successfully guessing bits of the secret key to a random guess. CCS CONCEPTS• Security and privacy → Security protocols; Symmetric cryptography and hash functions.

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Section: Evaluation Of Security Metricsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Man-in-the-Middle Attack Resistant Secret Key Generation via Channel Randomization

Pan

et al. 2021

Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Symposium on Theory, Algorithmic Foundations, and Protocol Design for Mobile Net

Self Cite

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“…The authors also have shown that channel-randomized version of the jamming scheme is robust against eavesdropping from a multi-antenna attacker[6],[11],[12] …”

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confidence: 99%

Technical Report: Insider-Resistant Context-Based Pairing for Multimodality Sleep Apnea Test

Zheng¹,

Islam²,

Pan³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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The increasingly sophisticated at-home screening systems for obstructive sleep apnea (OSA), integrated with both contactless and contact-based sensing modalities, bring convenience and reliability to remote chronic disease management. However, the device pairing processes between system components are vulnerable to wireless exploitation from a noncompliant user wishing to manipulate the test results. This work presents SIENNA, an insider-resistant context-based pairing protocol. SIENNA leverages JADE-ICA to uniquely identify a user's respiration pattern within a multi-person environment and fuzzy commitment for automatic device pairing, while using friendly jamming technique to prevent an insider with knowledge of respiration patterns from acquiring the pairing key. Our analysis and test results show that SIENNA can achieve reliable (> 90% success rate) device pairing under a noisy environment and is robust against the attacker with full knowledge of the context information.

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Cross-Modality Continuous User Authentication and Device Pairing With Respiratory Patterns

Islam,

Zheng,

Pan

et al. 2023

IEEE Internet Things J.

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ROBin: Known-Plaintext Attack Resistant Orthogonal Blinding via Channel Randomization

Cited by 4 publications

References 32 publications

Man-in-the-Middle Attack Resistant Secret Key Generation via Channel Randomization

Man-in-the-Middle Attack Resistant Secret Key Generation via Channel Randomization

Technical Report: Insider-Resistant Context-Based Pairing for Multimodality Sleep Apnea Test

Cross-Modality Continuous User Authentication and Device Pairing With Respiratory Patterns

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