Robert McNamara's Other War

Gillian Hart in Beijing: Negotiating capitalist models at the World Bank–China nexus

“…During Robert McNamara's tenure as President (1968)(1969)(1970)(1971)(1972)(1973)(1974)(1975)(1976)(1977)(1978)(1979)(1980)(1981), it had transitioned from a conservative, productivist, project-based lending bureaucracy to a large quantitative economic research center and development agency focused on devising national policy strategies. The geopolitical-economic threat of decolonization, economic nationalism, and mounting inequality in the developing world led the former Secretary of Defense to expand the Bank's agricultural and social infrastructure lending, with new programs focused on agricultural credit provision, public health, family planning, sanitation, housing provision, and education aimed at the political neutralization of the peasantry (Pereira, 2020;Sharma, 2017). After 1973, the availability of cheap credit through recycled petrodollars reduced the Bank's stature as lender, prompting McNamara's efforts to promote its role as a provider of technical assistance and research.…”

The Return of International Finance and the Martínez de Hoz Plan in Argentina, 1976–1978

“…Bank lending was shifting from middle income countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina to poorer nations; and from infrastructure projects toward agriculture and rural development. 22 Moreover, due to apparent failings of current project lending policies, the institution was debating a new policy that as from early 1980 would hinge on structural adjustment loans with stronger conditionality criteria (Sharma 2013b(Sharma , 2017.…”

“…Foreign bankers with whom relations had been rebuilt were "supplementary financiers" of foreign exchange needs again. In October 1976 Japanese banks granted a US$75 million loan to repay previous short-term loans and signaled Argentina's opening to the rising capital market of Tokyo (Martínez de Hoz 2014, 33 Sharma (2013aSharma ( , 2017 and Finnemore (1997, 217-219) discuss IBRD changes and conditionality. 23 Financial support amounted to US$1,300 million and included a one-year US$300 million standby agreement with the Fund.…”

“…The loans came from the Banco de la Nación Argentina, which had to resort to international financial intermediation, and a consortium of US, Canadian, and West European banks led by Wells Fargo Bank, because Central Bank support was no longer available and the local capital market was insufficient for these purposes. 33 For the data, criteria, and controversies on Chile and human rights in general we draw on Schoultz (1981Schoultz ( , 295-299, 1982; Sharma (2013aSharma ( , 2017 Sharma (2013a, 595-596). IDB loans were for the state and the private sector and focused on similar sectors to those of the World Bank.…”

“…These publications ignored the substantial inroads of historians, sociologists, and political scientists on the history of world banking, capital markets, the internal dynamics of the last military dictatorship, the international financial community, and the US government (Novaro and Palermo 2003;Heredia 2004;Canelo 2004Canelo , 2008Avenburg 2015;Martínez de Hoz 2014;Cassis 2010;Altamura 2015). They also sidestepped relevant literature on the policies and institutional changes in multilateral lending agencies (see for example Babb 2009;Sharma 2013bSharma , 2017Gould 2006;Vreeland 2003;Copelovitch 2010;Chwieroth 2008Chwieroth , 2010. The input of these recent scholarly perspectives, as well as a closer look at other unused sources such as the recent memoirs of Martínez de Hoz, adds to our understanding of the Argentine case and catches up debates on the international financial relations of Mexico and Chile from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system to the outbreak of the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s (Kedar 2015(Kedar , 2017a(Kedar , 2017b(Kedar , 2018aAlvarez 2015Alvarez , 2017Alvarez , 2018Kershaw 2018).…”