Roadblocks in Reforming Corrupt Agencies: The Case of the New York City School Custodians

Abstract

Reformers have traditionally assumed that agencies can combat corruption through controls such as tighter oversight, increased regulation, internal audits, reorganizations, and performance accountability mechanisms. But this case study of the New York City school custodial system shows how a corrupt agency can derail these devices. New York City's $500,000,000 custodial system, responsible for maintaining its 1,200 schools, has been unleashing scandals since the 1920s despite decades of regulations, multiple reorganizations, and layers of oversight. Its history shows that a deviant culture—a management “captured” by special interests—and an infrastructure enmeshed in abusive policies will resist controls, no matter how well‐crafted. True reform requires tackling institutionalized corruption through strategies like overhauling management, eradicating special interests, and aggressively punishing misconduct.

Civil service management and corruption: What we know and what we don't

“…Moreover, seniority‐based promotions may affect corruption incentives. In particular, where career advancements are determined solely based on seniority and unrelated to performance, incentives for employees to dismantle performance‐reducing corrupt systems are stomped (Segal , p. 448). At the same time, seniority‐based promotions may curb corruption by protecting employees from political pressure and enhancing the predictability of future pay rises—and thus opportunity costs of corruption.…”

“…While employees are protected from political pressure to engage in corrupt activities, they are also protected against dismissal unless unlawful behaviour can be proven, which is often difficult for covert behaviour such as corruption (Oliveros and Schuster ). Hence, while employment protection can protect honest employees from corrupt politicians and managers, it can also protect corrupt employees from honest politicians and managers (Segal ). If this happens, the long‐term socialization from job stability may be ineffective as colleagues do not report colleagues, or backfire when veterans socialize newcomers to corrupt behaviour (De Graaf and Huberts ).…”

Why Has Public Administration Ignored Public Education, and Does It Matter?

“…Of the eight articles on public education appearing in PAR from 2000 onward, five articles apply public administration questions to Texas school districts, and four of these articles are coauthored by Kenneth Meier (e.g., Meier and Williams 2002). The three remaining articles discuss public school finance (Moser and Rubinstein 2002), school custodian corruption (Segal 2002), and judicial supervision of public schools (Wise and O’Leary 2003). Meier also coauthored three of the nine articles on public education published in the other four top public administration journals, all analyzing Texas public schools.…”

“…Scholars who have been willing to cross the public administration–public education barrier illustrate the contributions that the study of public education can make to public administration. For example, Segal’s (2002) work on corruption in the school custodian system in New York City illustrates how corruption can resist controls and what reforms are necessary for addressing such abuse. Glaser, Denhardt, and Hamilton (2002) help us better measure citizen commitment to community and describe how to mobilize such commitment.…”

From Bad to Worse: A Social Contagion Model of Organizational Misbehavior

“…Theft is one example of organizational misbehavior that is susceptible to group effects and is often a group-supported activity (Horning, 1970). Despite the fact that it is destructive to the organization, or perhaps because it is so, work groups not only support theft but at times encourage it and even sanction those who do not participate (Segal, 2002). Additionally, group norms regulate the items, processes, and parameters for stealing from an employer (Sieh, 1987).…”