RKA Security of Identity-Based Homomorphic Signature Scheme

Chang, Jinyong; Ma, Hui; Zhang, Anling; Xu, Mingzhen; Xue, Rui

doi:10.1109/access.2019.2908244

Cited by 19 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In 2015, Morita et al proved that the famous Schnorr signature and DSA algorithms are not RKA-secure but a slight modification of them yielded fully RKA secure schemes [20]. In [11] and [13], Chang et al respectively introduced the RKA security into the model of network coding signature (see [12]) and identity-based homomorphic signature schemes. However, note that in [13], the authors only considered the RKA occurs for KGC although in the whole identity-based homomorphic signature scheme the signer also has a secret key.…”

Section: A Related-key Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

RKA Security for Identity-Based Signature Scheme

Chang

Wang

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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Related-key attack (RKA) is a kind of side-channel attack considered for kinds of cryptographic primitives, such as public key encryption, digital signature, pseudorandom functions etc. However, we note that the RKA-security seems to be not considered for identity-based signature (IBS), which is an important primitive for identity-based cryptography and proposed by Shamir in 1984. In this paper, for the first time, we introduce the RKA security into IBS schemes and try to define the security model for it. More specifically, we consider the RKA occurs in the users' signing key or the master key of the key-generation center (KGC), which derives two kinds of RKA securities for IBS. Meanwhile, we illustrate that the most efficient Schnorr-like IBS scheme proposed by Galindo and Garcia is RKA-insecure by launching a simple RKA. However, a slight modification of it yields a RKA-secure IBS scheme, for which we give the detailed security proof in the random oracle. Finally, the performance analysis shows that the modified scheme is still extremely efficient but has higher security. INDEX TERMS Related-key attack, identity-based signature, random oracle model.

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Section: A Related-key Attackmentioning

confidence: 99%

RKA Security for Identity-Based Signature Scheme

Chang

Wang

et al. 2020

IEEE Access

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“…It is easy to see that the security notions of active and concurrent attacks are stronger than the notion of passive attacks. Generally, we pursue stronger security notion for crytographic schemes, such as [18,19].…”

Section: Security Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identity-Based Identification Scheme without Trusted Party against Concurrent Attacks

Tang

Bao

Huang

et al. 2020

Security and Communication Networks

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Identification schemes support that a prover who holding a secret key to prove itself to any verifier who holding the corresponding public key. In traditional identity-based identification schemes, there is a key generation center to generate all users’ secret keys. This means that the key generation center knows all users’ secret key, which brings the key escrow problem. To resolve this problem, in this work, we define the model of identity-based identification without a trusted party. Then, we propose a multi-authority identity-based identification scheme based on bilinear pairing. Furthermore, we prove the security of the proposed scheme in the random oracle model against impersonation under passive and concurrent attacks. Finally, we give an application of the proposed identity-based identification scheme to blockchain.

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“…In fact, in cryptography, homomorphic signature scheme is another technique to protect network coding against pollution attack [3]- [5], [11]. Contrast to homomorphic MAC scheme, it is a kind of public key authentication method.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security Analysis of an Efficient Null Space-Based Homomorphic MAC Scheme Against Tag Pollution Attacks in RLNC

et al. 2019

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Recently, Esfahani, Mantas, and Rodriguez proposed a homomorphic message authentication code (MAC) scheme for the random linear network coding (RLNC) to resist tag pollution attacks (TPAs), and also presented the security analysis. As Esfahani et al. said, their scheme is based on the null space properties of Kehdi and Li, and the main contribution lies in adding the process of swapping when generating the tags for data packets. However, in this paper, we first point out that Esfahani et al.'s swapping technique is not essential for the TPA security, because the underlying non-swapping homomorphic MAC scheme has been secure against TPA and the process of swapping only improves the TPA security with a non-negligible factor. More importantly, we find that the security proof of Esfahani et al. is incorrect and misguided. In particular, according to Esfahani et al. suggestion, one should enlarge the number of neighbor nodes to reduce the probability of the TPA. However, this paper gives contrary suggestions in Esfahani et al.'s work by presenting the precise proof for the proposed homomorphic MAC scheme.INDEX TERMS Homomorphic MAC, network coding, tag pollution attack (TPA).

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RKA Security of Identity-Based Homomorphic Signature Scheme

Cited by 19 publications

References 21 publications

RKA Security for Identity-Based Signature Scheme

RKA Security for Identity-Based Signature Scheme

Identity-Based Identification Scheme without Trusted Party against Concurrent Attacks

Security Analysis of an Efficient Null Space-Based Homomorphic MAC Scheme Against Tag Pollution Attacks in RLNC

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