Risky business or competitive power? supplier involvement in Japanese product design

Supplier integration—Controlling of co-development processes

“…They distinguish relationship structuring differentiators and asset allocation differentiators for the success of a new product. Wasti and Liker (1997) Analysis of supplier involvement in Japanese car industry Empirical-survey Through hypotheses, developed based on the Japanese partnership model (relational contracting), predictions are made on the level of supplier involvement in design based on product characteristics and supplier capabilities. Wingert (1997) Competitive advantage through supplier integration Empirical Competitive advantages by supplier integration.…”

An empirical study on the influencing factors of supplier involvement in new product development

“…Influencing factors at the cooperative relationship level include complexity of component development, uncertainty of component technology, the role of components in the entire system and the level of supplier competitiveness (Wasti and Liker, 1997;Wynstra and Pierick, 2000;Dowlatshahi, 1992;Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995). …”

Portfolio of controls in outsourcing relationships for global new product development

“…The second problem is switching costs as a result of earlier buyer commitments to particular product technologies or suppliers (Heide & John, 1988;Heide & Weiss, 1995). As a result, even though past relationships constitute avenues for interfirm learning and increase firms' adaptability, they create a degree of supplier-buyer interdependence (Carson, 2007;Mikkola, 2003;Wasti & Liker, 1997). Overall, the costs and consequences of outsourcing for buyers include external dependence, functional mismatches, and coordination difficulties, along with the gradual loss of design, manufacturing, marketing and other knowledge-based capabilities (Appleyard, 2003;Swan & Allred, 2003;Wilson et al, 1990).…”

“…As TCE and agency theory predict, the closer a particular activity is comes to the firm's technological core, the higher its asset specificity (Swan & Allred, 2003;Teece, 1988;Wasti & Liker, 1997). This brings about the reluctance to relinquish control over the activity and/or the necessity for safeguarding and control mechanisms.…”

“…This increases the specificity of the supplier's and the buyer's interdependence, and therefore the buyer may prefer behavior control (Stump & Heide, 1996;Wasti & Liker, 1997;Wilson et al, 1990). However, in such conditions, evaluation based on both behavior and outcomes may become ambiguous, leading to the use of more informal controls (Lawless & Price, 1992).…”