Risk‐sensitive sizing of responsive facilities

Abstract

Abstract:We develop a risk-sensitive strategic facility sizing model that makes use of readily obtainable data and addresses both capacity and responsiveness considerations. We focus on facilities whose original size cannot be adjusted over time and limits the total production equipment they can hold, which is added sequentially during a finite planning horizon. The model is parsimonious by design for compatibility with the nature of available data during early planning stages. We model demand via a univariate random variable with arbitrary forecast profiles for equipment expansion, and assume the supporting equipment additions are continuous and decided ex-post. Under constant absolute risk aversion, operating profits are the closed-form solution to a nontrivial linear program, thus characterizing the sizing decision via a single first-order condition. This solution has several desired features, including the optimal facility size being eventually decreasing in forecast uncertainty and decreasing in risk aversion, as well as being generally robust to demand forecast uncertainty and cost errors. We provide structural results and show that ignoring risk considerations can lead to poor facility sizing decisions that deteriorate with increased forecast uncertainty. Existing models ignore risk considerations and assume the facility size can be adjusted over time, effectively shortening the planning horizon. Our main contribution is in addressing the problem that arises when that assumption is relaxed and, as a result, risk sensitivity and the challenges introduced by longer planning horizons and higher uncertainty must be considered. Finally, we derive accurate spreadsheet-implementable approximations to the optimal solution, which make this model a practical capacity planning tool.

The buyer’s procuring mechanism under operating cost sharing in supply chain

“…There are numerous papers that study lead time competition through operations strategies, e.g., [10][11][12][13]. In these papers, the suppliers compete for final demand that is sensitive to delivery lead time, so the competition structure is exogenous.…”