Risk buffering and resource access shape valuation of out-group strangers

Abstract

Unlike other primates, humans exhibit extensive inter-group tolerance and frequently build relationships with out-group members. Despite its common occurrence, little is known about the conditions leading to out-group relationship building in humans. What are the social and ecological factors promoting valuation of out-group members as potential social partners? Do they differ from those promoting valuation of in-group members? We propose that opportunities for non-local resource access and resource buffering, crucial in the human foraging niche, will increase valuation of out-group strangers. Using survey and experimental data collected among three Bolivian horticultural populations, we find that individuals with fewer non-locally available resources and more information about out-groups demonstrate more generosity toward out-group strangers, but not in-group strangers. The effects are specific to subjective resource access, not objective measures of access, and out-group exposure, not stereotypes. Further, depending on the measure, existing network connections affect both out-group and in-group giving, suggesting that new partnerships from both in-groups and out-groups may bolster one’s networks. Our results illustrate how evolved human psychology is sensitive to the costs and benefits of both out-group and in-group relationships, but underscore that the social and ecological factors favoring new relationships with in-group versus out-group strangers may differ.

The evolution of intergroup tolerance in nonhuman primates and humans

“…For field researchers studying humans, we urge caution with respect to reliance on observational data and “complete” social networks. Asking participants about their social strategies for mitigating shortfalls, their preferences for same‐community vs between‐community relationships, and their extra‐community ties may provide a more accurate picture of the flexibility of human sociality. Furthermore, the dedication of increased research effort to intergroup encounters and association in gorillas and bonobos, as well as habituation of neighboring groups, will improve our understanding of sociality in the group‐living nonhuman great apes.…”

“…Humans have social networks on scales unseen in nonhuman primates, networks that often span group boundaries—suggesting that incentives for association with extra‐group members must (at least sometimes) be high. To what extent may the domains highlighted in Table account for the flexibility and high prevalence of intergroup tolerance observed in extant humans?…”

The cognitive and cultural foundations of moral behavior

“…Brodbeck et al, 2013;Cohn et al, 2014;Cronk, 2007;Lesorogol, 2007;Gerkey, 2013;Smaldino, 2014), thus making them more salient in situ. While our results suggest that the composition of mental models predicts cooperative behavior that transcends what might otherwise be parochial boundaries (e.g., Hruschka et al, 2014;Pisor and Gurven, 2016), examining when, and where, and to whom participants claim these moral prescriptions apply would be a logical next step for future inquiry (cf. Fessler et al, 2015).…”

“…Moreover, recall that target recipients were geographically distant individuals with whom participants are unlikely to interact; we assessed whether or not cultural content can induce impartial and honest behavior in interactions we know are not happening regularly in our study sites. Other options for assessing interactions are likely to miss these rare encounters (Pisor and Gurven, 2016). As our religious belief measures showed a relatively strong association with allocation, this suggests that we cannot easily dismiss the value of using such games in toto.…”

Preferences and constraints: The value of economic games for studying human sociality

“…In contrast, games in which the decider is anonymous but the recipient is not may reveal decider preferences conditional on recipient characteristics and relational characteristics (e.g., past disagreements between the decider and recipient), revealing how cooperative behavior is structured by interpersonal sentiments [12]. Further, games in which neither the decider nor the recipient are anonymous may reveal decider preferences to make a positive first impression on a stranger [28,29].…”