Risk-Based Stopping Criteria for Test Sequencing

Boumen, R.; Jong, Ivo de; Vermunt, J.W.H.; Mortel-Fronczak, J.M. van de; Rooda, J.E.

doi:10.1109/tsmca.2008.2003470

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If the test time and cost exceeds the risk cost then we should stop the testing. For a software test phase its possible to evaluate the optimal test sequence which can do risk reduction in a given time frame 6 . The required amount of subsystem testing can be calculated once the reliability tests can be calculated.…”

Section: Fig 6: Fault Tree Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring Computing Environment Possibilities for Risk Oriented Testing

Malik

Singh

2017

Orient. J. Chem

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The present research effort analyses various application areas of risk oriented testing and indentifies the gaps from the past .We need risk oriented testing not only for identifying risks in the projects but also for the maximum optimization of resources .Our research stresses on risk oriented testing in pervasive and evolutionary computational areas as due to dynamicity of such computing environment ,the project imbibes risk in great measure and needs to be taken care in early stages of the project . Risk oriented testing requires concentration in both of these application areas as extremely little work has been done in this regard.

show abstract

Section: Fig 6: Fault Tree Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring Computing Environment Possibilities for Risk Oriented Testing

Malik

Singh

2017

Orient. J. Chem

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Coordination of verification activities with incentives: a two-firm model

2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In systems engineering, verification activities evaluate the extent to which a system under development satisfies its requirements. In large systems engineering projects, multiple firms are involved in the system development, and hence verification activities must be coordinated. Self-interest impedes the implementation of verification strategies that are beneficial for all firms while encouraging each firm to choose a verification strategy beneficial to itself. Incentives for verification activities can motivate a single firm to adopt verification strategies beneficial to all firms in the project, but these incentives must be offered judiciously to minimize unnecessary expenditures and prevent the abuse of goodwill. In this paper, we use game theory to model a contractor-subcontractor scenario, in which the subcontractor provides a component to the contractor, who further integrates it into their system. Our model uses belief distributions to capture each firm’s epistemic uncertainty in their component’s state prior to verification, and we use multiscale decision theory to model interdependencies between the contractor and subcontractor’s design. We propose an incentive mechanism that aligns the verification strategies of the two firms and using our game-theoretic model, we identify those scenarios where the contractor benefits from incentivizing the subcontractor’s verification activities.

show abstract