2012
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01694.x
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Risk Aversion and Trade‐Union Membership*

Abstract: If trade unions provide only their members with insurance against income variations, as a private good, this insurance will provide a stronger incentive for more risk‐averse employees to become union members. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and various direct measures of individual risk attitudes, we find robust evidence of a positive relationship between risk aversion and the likelihood of union membership for full‐time employees. This association is particularly strong for males and in… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…Had the ISSP been a panel study following the same individuals over time and with data on individuals entering and exiting union membership (Elias 1996; Visser 2002), we could provide a stronger test. At present, using repeated cross sections, we cannot exclude that worker ability (yielding higher earnings or favouring individualistic behaviour) and risk aversion (leading workers to accept lower wages in exchange for longer contract duration, as well as raising the demand for union protection — see Goerke and Pannenberg (2007)) — may also account for part of our results 15…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 86%
“…Had the ISSP been a panel study following the same individuals over time and with data on individuals entering and exiting union membership (Elias 1996; Visser 2002), we could provide a stronger test. At present, using repeated cross sections, we cannot exclude that worker ability (yielding higher earnings or favouring individualistic behaviour) and risk aversion (leading workers to accept lower wages in exchange for longer contract duration, as well as raising the demand for union protection — see Goerke and Pannenberg (2007)) — may also account for part of our results 15…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 86%
“…One answer is that unions also provide some private goods to their members such as strike pay, legal assistance, employment protection, and insurance against income variations, which act as "selective incentives" for joining a union (Goerke and Pannenberg 2012). The most prominent explanation of union existence probably is that workers comply with a social custom of union membership.…”
Section: Theoretical and Empirical Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, in case of a dismissal, union members have a higher probability of receiving severance pay (Goerke and Pannenberg 2010). Finally, Goerke and Pannenberg (2012) find that risk-averse workers are more likely to be union members. This conforms to the notion that unions provide exclusive insurance services to their members.…”
Section: The German Industrial Relations Systemmentioning
confidence: 74%