Risk allocation and benefit distribution of PPP projects for construction waste recycling: a case study of China

Wang, Zhenshuang; Zhou, Yanxin; Jin, Xiaohua; Zhao, Ning; Sun, Jun

doi:10.1108/ecam-10-2021-0855

Cited by 21 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 82 publications

(164 reference statements)

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“…At the same time as Wang, Z.S. et al [53] found that government departments and social capital sectors can gain more benefits after adopting the cooperative model. The same is true for the general contractor and subcontractor; both of them can only cooperate to obtain the maximum benefit, and the optimal outcome of both sides of the game many times is cooperation [54], which is consistent with reality.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects

Wang

Gao

2023

Buildings

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In the supply chain of general contracting projects, there are many participating entities, which can easily lead to conflicts of interest and resources. In order to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of general contractors and subcontractors, achieve stability, maximize the benefits of the supply chain system, and improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain, it is necessary to design a scientifically reasonable mechanism for benefit distribution to coordinate the relationships between all members. This paper takes the general contractor and subcontractor in the supply chain of the general contracting project as the research objects and uses the Cobb–Douglas function to establish the benefit distribution model of the cooperation between the two in the supply chain system and analyzes the benefit distribution problem of the one-time cooperation and multiple cooperation between the two parties in the two decision-making modes of egoism and collectivism. The results show that in the case of one-time cooperation between general contractors and subcontractors, regardless of the decision mode, the degree of effort of both parties is positively related to their contributions and negatively related to each other’s contributions; the overall benefit of the supply chain system is positively proportional to the degree of contribution of the general contractor and inversely proportional to the share of benefit distribution of the subcontractor. In multiple cooperation, the equilibrium result of both parties achieving Pareto optimality at each stage is that both parties choose to cooperate.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects

Wang

Gao

2023

Buildings

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“…BWM, a multi-criterion decision-making method 29 , is employed to determine the weights of a set of criteria or factors, providing clarity on their impact in decision-making problems. This method offers the advantage of yielding consistent results with minimal comparative information and has found widespread application in project selection 30 , supplier evaluation 31,32 , investment decisions, determining the appropriate location in the field of clean energy 33 , equipment selection 34 , project subcontracting 35,36 , etc. By integrating the BWM with the FCE, we formulated an evaluation model capable of considering quantitative factors, making it suitable for the intricate and multidisciplinary nature of DT platforms.…”

Section: Bwm-fce Evaluation Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domain-specific Digital Twin Platforms: Concept, Evaluation Framework and Case Study

Tang,

Zhuang,

Zhang

2024

Preprint

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As digital twin (DT) applications continue to proliferate across diverse industries, a noticeable gap exists in the availability of evaluation methods or frameworks to aid in the selection and development of DT platforms, particularly for Domain-specific application. To address this gap, this paper proposes a comprehensive evaluation framework for DT platforms, with a focus on Domain-specific application. The framework uses the Best-Worst Method and Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation method (BWM-FCE) to assess the performance, user experience, and economic effects of DT platforms. The proposed framework is applied to a case study of a high-speed railway DT platform and compared with other evaluation methods (Analytic Hierarchy Process and Best-Worst Method-Set Pair Analysis). The results demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed framework and highlight its potential for guiding the development and selection of DT platforms for Domain-specific applications.

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“…Reasons why a mature CDW recycling market mechanism cannot be formed [26,27] Channels for solving CDW resource problems [28,29] Research status of CDW recycling PPP projects [30][31][32][33][34] Compensation mechanism during PPP projects operation period…”

Section: Cdw Recycling Ppp Projectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On the one hand, most studies have considered the risk-sharing mechanism, income distribution model, public supervision, and government reward and punishment system and support policies of CDW recycling PPP projects [30,31]. Unfortunately, the exist-ing research does not focus on the performance of CDW resourceful PPP projects in the operation stage.…”

Section: Cdw Recycling Ppp Projectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Can Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Public–Private Partnership Projects Performance Compensate during the Operation Period? A Two-Stage Perspective of Recycling and Remanufacturing

Liu

Hao

et al. 2023

Systems

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Research in the field of project management has focused on recycling construction and demolition waste (CDW). However, the problem of how to compensate for the performance of CDW recycling public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operation period has not been resolved. This paper aims to reveal the compensation mechanism during the operation period of CDW recycling PPP projects considering the two-stage performance of recycling and remanufacturing. This paper takes CDW recycling PPP projects as the research object and uses the Stackelberg game and principal-agent theory to establish and solve the master-slave game decision model of CDW recycling PPP projects. The main conclusions are as follows. When social welfare is maximized, the performance compensation coefficients in the recycling and remanufacturing stages are the same and have homogeneity. In addition, the compensation policy positively promotes the two-stage performance, social capital profit and social welfare of the recycling and remanufacturing of CDW recycling PPP projects. This paper not only broadens the application knowledge system of the relevant knowledge of project management in the field of CDW recycling but also provides new evidence for principal-agent theory from the operation stage of CDW recycling PPP projects.

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Risk allocation and benefit distribution of PPP projects for construction waste recycling: a case study of China

Cited by 21 publications

References 82 publications

Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects

Model and Simulation of Benefit Distribution of Collaborative Cooperation in the Supply Chain of General Contracting Projects

Domain-specific Digital Twin Platforms: Concept, Evaluation Framework and Case Study

How Can Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Public–Private Partnership Projects Performance Compensate during the Operation Period? A Two-Stage Perspective of Recycling and Remanufacturing

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