Rising powers and the responsibility to protect: will the norm survive in the age of BRICS?

Abstract

What is the view of the BRICS countries regarding the international community's Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) against civilian atrocities? This paper revisits the debate on international humanitarian action in Libya and Syria 2011-2012; a time with BRICS states as members of the United Nation Security Council. While BRICS countries from the outset had different views on RtoP, the experiences of the Libyan intervention led to a unanimous reluctance to initiate any humanitarian action in Syria. We find, however, that all BRICS except Russia in general are positive to the RtoP concept and are willing to participate in further developments to specify how and when it applies. On the basis of our analysis, we expect that RtoP will continue to be an important feature of international relations but that it primarily will be used against non-state actors and that the behavior of the interveners may be subjected to UNSC scrutiny.2

UN Peacekeeping in a Multipolar World Order: Norms, Role Expectations, and Leadership

“…Second, rising powers have upheld the principle of respect for national sovereignty, for instance questioning the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) on the grounds that it can lead to violations of national sovereignty, that the norm is invoked in a highly selective manner that serves narrow Western interests, and that it has tended to lead to (at best) highly uncertain outcomes (Laskaris and Kreutz 2015). This scepticism was in full view when the BRICS countries criticised the UNSC Resolution 1973 in 2011, which permitted the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya.…”

Rising Power and Norm Containment: An Examination of China’s Shifting Response to Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century

“…Subject to the "fairly sharp othering" discourse, a rising China is often oversimplified as either an iconoclastic free-rider "irrelevant to emerging post-Cold War norms," or "simply an insurmountable obstacle, so far out of step that it should be ignored." (Adler-Nissen 2014;Zarakol 2010;Johnston 2003;Ooi and D'Arcangelis 2017;Davis et al 2004;Laskaris and Kreutz 2015;Davis 2010) However, a close examination of China's strategic behaviours towards humanitarian interventions in the UNSC from 1971 to 2020 lends little credence to this claim. Beijing was never too aloof from contentious discussions.…”