Rising Inequality: A Benign Outgrowth of Markets or a Symptom of Cancerous Political Favours?

Frijters, Paul; Foster, Gigi

doi:10.1111/1467-8462.12096

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

(14 reference statements)

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“…Thus, it reduces overall economic welfare. This welfare loss is exacerbated when rent-seeking results in welfare-distorting decisions by state actors (Anam, 1982) or increases inequality by reducing the progressivity of the tax and transfer system (Frijters & Foster, 2014).…”

Section: Rent-seeking Behaviour and Regulatory Capturementioning

confidence: 99%

Rent-seeking behaviour and regulatory capture in the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia

Grafton

Williams

2019

International Journal of Water Resources Development

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We examine water governance in the Murray-Darling Basin using the frameworks of rent-seeking and regulatory capture. These frameworks are used to evaluate two government programmes intended to ensure an environmentally sustainable level of water diversions in the basin: targeted one-on-one purchases of water entitlements from designated sellers; and subsidies for irrigation infrastructure to increase irrigation efficiency. Deficiencies in delivering the stated environmental goals of both programmes, and questions about their 'value for money', are highlighted. Specific recommendations are provided about how to mitigate both rent-seeking and regulatory capture of water reform initiatives in large river basins.

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Section: Rent-seeking Behaviour and Regulatory Capturementioning

confidence: 99%

Rent-seeking behaviour and regulatory capture in the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia

Grafton

Williams

2019

International Journal of Water Resources Development

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“…The 'game of mates' is played so well in Australia that 63 percent of its billionaires have attained their wealth through political connections, in much the same manner as India and Colombia, as opposed to 1 percent in the United States [175]. More than 80 percent of Australia's richest 200 Australians have made their fortunes in property, mining, banking, superannuation and finance, all of which are heavily regulated sectors in which enormous fortunes can be made through favourable planning, legal and regulatory exemptions, concessions and subsidies [176].…”

Section: Theorizing the Social Power Of Covert Network In Australia's Energy And Resource Sectorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigating networks of corporate influence on government decision-making: The case of Australia’s climate change and energy policies

Lucas

2021

Energy Research & Social Science

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This paper argues that the ability of dominant corporations in the fossil fuel and other polluting industries to shape government policy on climate change and energy issues is directly related to their financial interests in particular countries, and emblematic of the crippling effect which they have exercised on the ability of nation states to decarbonise. Using Australia as an exemplar of the many favourable policy outcomes which powerful corporate interests have secured from successive governments in relation to climate and energy policy, it seeks to demonstrate that covert networks of political influence have played a major role in the decisions made and actions implemented in both areas of policymaking over the last fifteen years. Through detailed empirical analysis of a database of current and former senior politicians, political staffers and bureaucrats with employment links to the fossil fuel and resource extraction industries, it argues that these industries have constructed a covert network of lobbyists and revolving door appointments which has ensured that industry interests continue to dominate Australia's energy policy, and that its emissions from fossil fuel use continue to rise. Covert corporate influence in Australia's energy and resource sectors provides an additional layer of explanation for the persistence of structural biases in its financing, policy and regulatory regimes to those accounts which draw on different forms of discourse and policy analysis. Recent research into the CCCM in the US and Canada has clearly revealed the pervasive and disproportionate influence of fossil energy and resource corporations on climate change and energy politics in two of the world's most politically and economically powerful developed countries [22][23][24][25][26][27][28]. This paper contributes to North American CCCM research as a comparative study of similar processes in Australia. It also

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“…Far more commonly, the most affluent operated in industries with limited competition or with significant reliance on government decisions. 124 One analysis from the 1990s looked at the industries in which the rich-listers made their fortunes. It concluded that about one-quarter grew wealthy in an industry that was uncompetitive at the time.…”

Section: Inflaming Inequality: the Cost Of Constrained Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Giant Problem: The Influence of the Chicago School on Australian Competition Law, Economic Dynamism and Inequality

Triggs

Leigh

2019

Federal Law Review

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Australia has a competition problem: there is not enough of it. Our industries are concentrated. Our markets show signs of weak competition. The way Australia’s courts, parliamentarians and regulators think about competition is partly to blame. Although it has been less influential in Australia than in the United States, the Chicago School’s views on competition have shaped our laws, policies and enforcement practices. The Chicago School views market concentration as a virtue more than a vice. The School contended that barriers to entry are negligible, market power is temporary, most mergers are good, vertical restraints and predatory pricing are either benign or efficient. The growing body of research and experience, however, shows that the Chicago School’s faith in the ability of markets to self-correct and deliver competitive outcomes was misplaced. There is a strong progressive case for repositioning how we think about competition. Focusing more on the competitive process, the structure of markets and the incentives those structures create for firms will play an important role in reducing inequality.

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Rising Inequality: A Benign Outgrowth of Markets or a Symptom of Cancerous Political Favours?

Cited by 7 publications

References 16 publications

Rent-seeking behaviour and regulatory capture in the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia

Rent-seeking behaviour and regulatory capture in the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia

Investigating networks of corporate influence on government decision-making: The case of Australia’s climate change and energy policies

A Giant Problem: The Influence of the Chicago School on Australian Competition Law, Economic Dynamism and Inequality

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