Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey

Abstract

On 6 September 2015 the Kurdish separatist group PKK attacked two armoured military vehicles in Daglica, a provincial town near Turkey's border with Iran and Iraq. This was the deadliest terrorist attack-17 dead and several others injured-since the launching of 'the peace process' in 2012. Announcing the incident on TV, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggested that such attacks would not have occurred if voters had given 400 MPs to 'one political party' in the June 2015 election. 1 After 13 years of single-party rule, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) founded by Erdogan had indeed lost its parliamentary majority in the June 2015 election and was forced to lead coalition talks with other parties. The national daily Hurriyet soon broadcast Erdogan's words from its website, thereby reinforcing the view widely shared by those in the opposition that the president had escalated the conflict with the PKK to win back conservative voters in the snap election scheduled for November 2015. Disturbed by his implied association with post-election violence, Erdogan protested to the newspaper. 2 A few hours later a group of AKP vigilantes, led by the leader of the AKP's youth branch and Istanbul MP, attacked Hurriyet's headquarters in Istanbul. 3 The police stood aside during the incident; 4 luckily no one was injured. This contentious day captured quite accurately the current condition of Turkish politics on the eve of the snap election. The AKP's desire to hang on to power despite its electoral defeat accompanied a dramatic rise in political violence and extra-parliamentary opposition, which, in turn, increased government pressure on dissent, including censorship in the media and implicit endorsement of violent attacks against the opposition by AKP supporters.

Does the Electoral System Foster a Predominant Party System? Evidence from Turkey

“…These changes, the blurring of the line between the party and the state, have significant implications for the nature of the regime. It is widely documented (e.g., Esen and Gümüşçü ; Özbudun ) that the regime is moving towards “competitive authoritarianism”, in which the incumbent party skews the political field to its advantage through controlling the media, bureaucracy and judiciary; exploiting public resources; and oppressing the opposition (Levitsky and Way ).…”

Why Do Peace Negotiations Succeed or Fail? Legal Commitment, Transparency, and Inclusion during Peace Negotiations in Colombia (2012–2016) and Turkey (2012–2015)

“…Turkey was engulfed in multiple crises between 2012 and 2015. The brutal crackdown during the 2013 Gezi protests signaled the regime's lack of commitment to peaceful conflict resolution; the fallout between the Gülen community (an erstwhile government ally) and Erdoğan unveiled the most serious corruption scandal in the nation's history; and finally, the government's response to the multiple political crises was to erode the foundations of constitutional checks and balances (Esen and Gumuscu ). Furthermore, the internationalization of the civil war in Syria increased the risk of cross‐border violence and provided PKK with the opportunity to extend, through its affiliate, into northern Syria.…”

The Turkish presidential elections of 24 June 2018

“…While Erdoğan was the clear frontrunner, he defied the opinion polls by winning the presidency in the first round with 52.6 per cent of the vote. We contend that in addition to benefiting from the uneven playing field that has been a feature of Turkey's competitive authoritarian regime (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016), Erdoğan owes this victory to his lasting popularity and growing hegemony over the political system. As the country's undisputed leader, Erdoğan still enjoys strong support among the conservative voters, many of whom attribute their economic achievements under the AKP rule to him.…”