Rising above Reactive Scaffolding

Abstract

This paper puts forward a novel, two-tiered view of moral agency which captures the key concerns of two competing theories. According to the capacitarian view, in order for someone to be an appropriate target of the reactive attitudes and practices, they must possess an independent, objective capacity for recognizing and responding to moral reasons. According to the moral influence view, this capacity fully depends for both development and maintenance on reactive scaffolding. I will argue that the moral influence view cannot account for the autonomous capacity involved in cases where agents go against the grain of their moral community. At the same time, however, the capacitarian view neglects the role of reactive scaffolding in moral development. My solution is to distinguish responsible agency, understood as reactive scaffolding-sensitivity, from moral autonomy, understood as autonomous moral reasons-sensitivity. However, while the moral influence view cannot explain moral autonomy, it gives a promising account of responsible agency and offers important insights into how we might develop moral autonomy.