2011 IEEE International Symposium on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks 2011
DOI: 10.1109/policy.2011.30
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Rigorous Analysis of UML Access Control Policy Models

Abstract: The use of the Unified Modeling Language (UML) for specifying security policies is attractive because it is expressive and has a wide user base in the software industry. However, there are very few mature tools that support rigorous analysis of UML models. Alloy is a formal specification language that has been used to rigorously analyze security policies, but few practitioners have the background needed to develop good Alloy models. We propose a new approach to policy analysis in which designers use UML at the… Show more

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Cited by 16 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 15 publications
(18 reference statements)
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“…The slicing technique is used to improve the efficiency of a model analysis technique that involves checking a sequence of operation invocations to uncover violations in specified invariants [SFR11]. The slicing approach automatically generates slicing criteria consisting of a subset of invariants and operation specifications, and uses the criteria to extract metamodel fragments, where each metamodel fragment can be analyzed separately.…”
Section: Model Slicingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The slicing technique is used to improve the efficiency of a model analysis technique that involves checking a sequence of operation invocations to uncover violations in specified invariants [SFR11]. The slicing approach automatically generates slicing criteria consisting of a subset of invariants and operation specifications, and uses the criteria to extract metamodel fragments, where each metamodel fragment can be analyzed separately.…”
Section: Model Slicingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Song et al use Aspect-Oriented Modelling to represent RBAC policies as crosscutting concerns in a UML model, and provides support for verifying properties that the model should satisfy [38]. Sun et al translate UML models to Alloy in order to verify properties using a SAT solver [39]. Finally, Sohr et al concentrate on the satisfaction of constraints such as separation of duty, using OCL [37], as well as dynamic, time-based constraints [26], using a domain-specific modelling language (DSML) for RBAC.…”
Section: Access Control and Verificationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several papers have examined the automated verification of AC models and generic policies, and a number of techniques have been proposed to verify them [8], [9], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20]. The great number of different techniques is mostly the result of the need for more expressive power or better performance.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%