Right in some respects: reasons as evidence

Abstract

What is a normative reason for acting? In this paper, I introduce and defend a novel answer to this question. The starting-point is the view that reasons are right-makers. By exploring difficulties facing it, I arrive at an alternative, according to which reasons are evidence of respects in which it is right to perform an act, for example, that it keeps a promise. This is similar to the proposal that reasons for a person to act are evidence that she ought to do so; however, as I explain, it differs from that proposal in two significant ways. As a result, I argue, the evidence-based account of reasons I advance shares the advantages of its predecessor while avoiding many of the difficulties facing it.

Normative Explanation And Justification*

“…A reason why a thing is good is something in the light of which it would be fitting to act or react in certain ways, and thus justifies those responses at least in some respect. 25 (NEJ) also falls out of views according to which normative reasons are evidence of a certain type (Kearns and Star 2009;Whiting 2018). If a fact is a reason why you ought to φ, it is evidence that there is at least some respect in which you ought to φ.…”

“…(NEJ) also falls out of views according to which normative reasons are evidence of a certain type (Kearns and Star 2009; Whiting 2018). If a fact is a reason why you ought to φ, it is evidence that there is at least some respect in which you ought to φ.…”

Epistemic Worth

“…18 17. moral worth 3 is neutral with respect to an issue central to the recent debate between proponents of explanation-based and evidence-based accounts of normative reasons. (For my contribution to that debate, see Whiting 2018. ) Suppose that evidence of a right-making feature is not a reason for acting (cf.…”

No Reasons to Believe the False

“…The precise connections between favoring and fittingness can be fleshed out in different ways. For instance, it can be claimed that reasons are facts that make a response fitting in some respect (Schroeter and Schroeter, ) or that reasons are evidence that there are such fitting‐making facts (Whiting, ). I remain neutral about whether we should understand reasons in terms of fittingness (McHugh and Way, ), the other way around (Scanlon, ; Schroeder, ; Parfit, ), or whether none of these notions is more fundamental than the other.…”