Riders on the storm: the politics of disruption in European member states during the COVID-19 pandemic

Abstract

This paper explores how democracies handle the trade-off between public safety and fundamental democratic principles. We show that an exogenous shock, like the pandemic, creates incentives for governing elites to deploy self-empowering mechanisms to avoid institutional checks and balances -with lasting consequences for democratic performance. We examine this prospect in Italy and Romania. These cases have a long history of institutional gridlock; such history reinforces incentives to work around traditional institutions in responding to the pandemic. While the two cases vary in terms of the quality and resilience of their democratic institutions, we find that elites displayed a similar propensity to overlook the intricate institutional balances during a moment of crisis. In Italy, the executive strengthened its power relative to the legislature; in Romania, the strengthening is relative to the judiciary. This finding has implications in assessing the risk for falling standards of liberal democracy across the European Union.

Coalition Politics in Central Eastern Europe

“…During the financial crisis, this led to the downfall of the Ungureanu cabinet and to the formation of Ponta I. During the pandemic, such self-aggrandizing policies led to maintaining prime minister Ludovic Orban in power, despite his losing the support of the legislative majority (Anghel and Jones 2022).…”

“…The COVID-19 pandemic also revealed patterns of opportunistic behaviour within the PNL leadership (Anghel and Jones 2022). The advent of the pandemic overlapped a constitutional conflict between president Klaus Iohannis and the legislative majority over the nomination of a prime minister.…”

“…President Klaus Iohannis used the COVID-19 pandemic to aggrandize his own powers (Anghel and Jones 2022). Together with Prime Minister Ludovic Orban, he institutionally and rhetorically targeted the parliament, the Constitutional Court and the ombudsman with the intention to weaken their position in the system.…”

“…The prominence of such opportunistic agendas is facilitated by ideologically flexible parties and the absence of transparent coalition governing programs. Informal institutions such as extreme party switching and corruption add to the set of challenges that subvert Romania's democratic consolidation (Anghel 2022).…”