Riddles of the Federal Constitutional Convention

Hutson, James H.

doi:10.2307/1939764

Cited by 13 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…His narrative describes a pair of major dimensions along with other ancillary, but still distinct dimensions (see Table 1). Our results are broadly consistent with other accounts from varying traditions (Bowen 1966; Dougherty and Heckelman 2006; Hutson 1987; Jillson and Anderson 1978; Londregan 1999; Rakove 1987; Slez and Martin 2007; Wirls and Wirls 2004), though we would place far more emphasis on the core, underlying fight over representation.…”

Section: Implications and Conclusionsupporting

confidence: 91%

“…We begin with the simplest possible arrangement-one not even considered in the literature-a single dimension. Note that all of the authors cited in Table 1 have referenced a representation dimension as a key division, and this pattern extends far beyond that group (Bestor 1989;Ellenbogen 1996;Hutson 1987;Jillson and Anderson 1978;Keller 1993;Knupfer 1991;Ohline 1971;Rakove 1996). Rakove describes the discussion of representation as "everything from heavyhanded threats and poker-faced bluffs to heartfelt pleas for accommodation, from candid avowals of interest to abstract appeals for justice" (1987,424), noting that it dominated the first six weeks of the convention debates.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Most historical discussion of the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly attempt to measure the dimensions or clearly scale the relationships between states and votes in the 1787 debate. The complexity of debate and the uncertainty surrounding the record have limited most scholars to a catalog of the most important votes and subjects raised by the delegates, particularly those subjects that are most salient in the first six weeks of the convention (Hutson 1987; McDonald 1958; McGuire 2003; Rakove 1996; Rossiter 1966, among many others). These narrative accounts of the convention have helped define our understanding of the Philadelphia Convention and the central issues: representation, the scope and power of the government, slavery compromises, the nature of the executive and separation of powers, among other lesser issues.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Mapping Dimensions of Conflict at the Federal Convention of 1787

Pope

Treier

2012

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Previous work on the Federal Convention of 1787 hypothesized multiple dimensions of conflict. We evaluate the dimensionality of conflict using a new method for estimating state delegation positions and proposals that incorporates the many divided votes at the convention. The results suggest that three dimensions are adequate for most analyses and the first dimension—proportional representation in the legislature—the most important. Finally, we examine how the agenda unfolds by mapping changes to the status quo throughout the convention. We conclude that, despite the lack of parties, the nature of the conflict is quite organized with a low number of dimensions.

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Section: Implications and Conclusionsupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mapping Dimensions of Conflict at the Federal Convention of 1787

Pope

Treier

2012

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…Conciliation and compromise led to agreement. (Garver 1944, 424) Garver's view of the importance of open-mindedness or conciliation has been endorsed, on some level, in a host of subsequent publications regardless of whether they praise or criticize the convention (Bestor 1989;Ellenbogen 1996;Hutson 1987;Jillson and Anderson 1978;Keller 1993;Knupfer 1991;Ohline 1971;Rakove 1996). Gordon Wood, in his masterpiece, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, portrayed the convention as consciously choosing a bicameralism to restrain the large state from taking control of the government, "[b]y this mixture of states and people .…”

Section: Deliberation and Moderationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reconsidering the Great Compromise at the Federal Convention of 1787: Deliberation and Agenda Effects on the Senate and Slavery

Pope

Treier

2011

American Journal of Political Science

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Conventional accounts of the Federal Convention of 1787 point to the many different compromises made at the convention, specifically the Great Compromise on representation and the Three-Fifths Compromise on slavery. Often these compromises are treated as separate events, the result of deliberation leading to moderation of delegate positions (presumably among the key states of Massachusetts and North Carolina). However, by applying the techniques of roll-call analysis, we find this traditional account is at best incomplete and probably misleading. While the Massachusetts delegation's behavior seems consistent with a moderation hypothesis, we find evidence that the other crucial vote for the Great Compromise-from North Carolina-is inconsistent with moderation, but can be linked through the agenda to the Three-Fifths Compromise over slavery, taxation, and representation. We conclude by arguing that this reconsideration of some of the convention's key votes should cause political scientists and historians to reevaluate how they see the compromises at the convention.

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“…See, e.g., Beard (1913), Diamond (1959), Smith (1965), Eidelberg (1968), Wood (1969), Goldwin and Schambra (1980), Dahl (2003), and Amar (2005). Hutson (1987) provides an overview.…”

Section: Theoretical Errorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Proportional Representation Debate at the Constitutional Convention: Why the Nationalists Lost

Coby¹

2018

American Political Thought

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Representation in the national legislature, whether proportionate to people or equal for all states, was the signature issue of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The resulting Great Compromise was the signature achievement. This article argues that the nationalists' loss on proportional representation cannot be explained simply as a pragmatic accommodation in the face of obdurate opposition by small-state delegations. Such obduracy existed, and it mattered. But it was met by obduracy in kind and in defense of a position that was inherently stronger. Why then did the nationalist coalition fail? It failed, the article contends, because, in addition to the opposition it encountered and the tactical mistakes it made, the three-part argument it mounted logically required that the states be abolished and the regime founded be a democracy. The large-state nationalists yielded in the end because they were not consolidationists and not democrats. One great anomaly of the American political system is that the principle of one person, one vote applies only to half of the legislative branch. In the Senate each state is equally represented no matter its size. Thus Wyoming, with a population under 600,000, has the same senatorial representation as California, with a population over 38,000,000. Sixty-five times more populous is California than Wyoming, and yet they both send two senators to Washington. The story of the Constitutional Convention and of the Great Compromise that made representation in the lower house proportional and in the upper house equal has been told many times before. What is intended here is not a retelling

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Riddles of the Federal Constitutional Convention

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Mapping Dimensions of Conflict at the Federal Convention of 1787

Mapping Dimensions of Conflict at the Federal Convention of 1787

Reconsidering the Great Compromise at the Federal Convention of 1787: Deliberation and Agenda Effects on the Senate and Slavery

The Proportional Representation Debate at the Constitutional Convention: Why the Nationalists Lost

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