Ricoeur and the ethics of care

Abstract

This introduction to the special issue on 'Ricoeur and the ethics of care' is not a standard editorial. It provides not only an explanation of the central questions and a first impression of the articles, but also a critical discussion of them by an expert in the field of care ethics, Joan Tronto. After explaining the reasons to bring Ricoeur into dialogue with the ethics of care (I), and analyzing how the four articles of this special issue shape this dialogue (II), the authors give the floor to Tronto (III). She focuses on the central issue at stake: what may be the value of a more abstract, conceptual approach for the ethics of care as a radically practice-oriented way of thinking? She argues that the four contributions too easily frame this value in terms of Ricoeur's relational anthropology. Instead she points out that if the ethics of care is a kind of practice, it makes sense to think of such practices as necessarily building upon one another, expanding constantly the context and relationships upon which practices are built. In the final section (IV) the authors respond to Tronto's framing of 'practices all the way up' by arguing that this approach need not be at odds with one inspired by Ricoeur's conceptual thinking. Rather the two can be seen as different movements-upwards and downwards-that both contribute constructively to the shaping of the important intermediary zone between the practices and the abstract ideals.Keywords The ethics of care Á Ricoeur Á Practices Á Practice-oriented reflection Á Abstract philosophical reflection Á Responsibility Á Philosophical anthropology Á Relational view of human beings Here I shall attempt to bring to light the simple fact that the practical field is not constituted from the ground up, starting from the simplest and moving to more elaborate constructions; rather it is formed in accordance with a twofold movement of ascending complexification starting from basic actions and from practices, and of descending specification starting from the vague and mobile horizon of ideals and projects in light of which a human life apprehends itself in its oneness. (Ricoeur 1992, 158)

Beyond demarcation: Care ethics as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry

“…10 Working from practice upwards, care ethics becomes an empirically grounded way of doing ethics. 23…”

What is the problem of dependency? Dependency work reconsidered

“…Here, we follow Tronto, who claims that ‘care practices are critical. Practitioners in care practices attempt to improve the way that they are engaging in their practice, and such reflection makes them reflective about the practice’ (van Nistelrooij, Schaafsma, & Tronto, 2014, p. 489). Following Tronto, we suggest that the practices in which care professionals engage might have much to reveal about the problem dependency poses for caregiving and how to deal with it.…”

Me? The invisible call of responsibility and its promise for care ethics: a phenomenological view

“…The first paradigm considers responsibility as something that has been accepted freely, like in a promise (Kittay 1999 ), that can be determined from a moral standpoint outside practices (Tronto 1993 ; Van Nistelrooij et al 2014 ), and fits within a theoretical-juridical view of morality (Walker 2007 ). The underlying anthropological assumption is that all moral agents are equal as individuals with equal rights (‘individual-based equality’, Kittay 1999 ) and that moral questions therefore centre around which rights I have as an individual and what rights others may assert.…”