The traditional concepts of rhetorical strategy and argumentative fallacy cannot be readily reconciled. Doing so requires escaping the following argument: All argumentation involves rhetorical strategies. All rhetorical strategies are violations of logical or dialectical ideals. All violations of logical or dialectical ideals are fallacies. Normative pragmatics provides a perspective in which rhetorical strategies can be seen to have the potential for constructive contributions to argumentation and in which fallacies are not simply violations of ideals. One kind of constructive contribution, framing moves, is illustrated with the case of Lyndon JohnsonÕs 1964 TV campaign commercial known as the Daisy ad.One of the central problems for argumentation theory is how to integrate the insights of rhetorical theory with those of logic and dialectical theory (see the various contributions to Houtlosser, 2000a, 2002a). This is not something that can be done easily by just, say, incorporating one kind of theory in the other, declaring parallel or complementary theoretical perspectives, identifying equivalent terms or adopting a common vocabulary, delineating the different subject-matters associated with each kind of theory, or simply using insights from all perspectives as deemed convenient in research projects or critical practice. There are real conflicts of principle and genuine conceptual contradictions among these traditions of theorizing, though not always easily uncovered and even less easily resolved. Given all the conceptual tensions we find among theories within traditions surely we should expect difficulties when looking across traditions.The traditional concepts of rhetorical strategy and argumentative fallacy present one such problem. In previous papers I have argued that these concepts are incompatible as they stand (Jacobs, 2000(Jacobs, , 2002(Jacobs, , 2005. Certain assumptions about rhetorical strategy and argumentative fallacy block efforts to genuinely integrate logical and dialectical theories of argumentation with rhetorical theories. The problem arises from the traditional understanding of what can and should properly