RF-DNA: Radio-Frequency Certificates of Authenticity

DeJean, G.; Kirovski, Darko

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_24

Cited by 62 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…A construction called radio-frequency-or RF-DNA was proposed in [8]. They construct a small (25 × 50 × 3mm) inexpensive token comparable to the one used for the optical PUF, but now they place thin copper wires in a random way in a silicon rubber sealant.…”

Section: Rf-dnamentioning

confidence: 99%

Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State of the Art and Future Research Directions

Maes

Verbauwhede

2010

Information Security and Cryptography

361

262

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Section: Rf-dnamentioning

confidence: 99%

Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State of the Art and Future Research Directions

Maes

Verbauwhede

2010

Information Security and Cryptography

361

262

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“…phenomena such as laser speckle based on multiple scattering. A PUF is a complex piece of material that is difficult to reproduce accurately because its manufacture inherently contains uncontrollable steps [16,8,3,18,11,5,25,19,17]. A stimulus can be applied to the PUF ('challenge'), leading to observable behavior (the 'response') that depends in a complex way on the challenge and the minute details of the PUF's structure.…”

Section: Physical Unclonable Functionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

SECURITY OF QUANTUM-READOUT PUFs AGAINST QUADRATURE-BASED CHALLENGE-ESTIMATION ATTACKS

Škorić

Mosk

Pinkse

2013

Int. J. Quantum Inform.

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The concept of quantum-secure readout of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) has recently been realized experimentally in an optical PUF system. We analyze the security of this system under the strongest type of classical attack: the challenge estimation attack. The adversary performs a measurement on the challenge quantum state in order to learn as much about it as he can. Using this knowledge he then tries to reconstruct the challenge and to emulate the PUF. We consider quadrature measurements, which are the most informative practical measurements known to us. We prove that even under this attack the expected number of photons detected in the verification mechanism is approximately a factor S + 1 too low; here S is the Quantum Security Parameter, defined as the number of modes in the optical system divided by the number of photons in the challenge. The photon count allows for a reliable distinction between an authentic PUF and a challenge estimation attack.

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“…The upside of using SIMPL systems in these situations over standard mathematical cryptotechniques or alternative approaches such as certificates of authenticity [12] or PUFs has been discussed in detail in [1]. It includes: (i) SIMPL systems do neither contain nor constitute any sort of secret binary information.…”

Section: Applications and Advantages Of Simpl Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards Electrical, Integrated Implementations of SIMPL Systems

Rührmair¹,

Chen²,

Stutzmann

et al. 2010

Information Security Theory and Practices. Security and Privacy of Pervasive Systems and Smart Devices

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This paper discusses the practical implementation of a novel security tool termed SIMPL system, which was introduced in [1]. SIMPL systems can be regarded as a public key version of physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Like the latter, a SIMPL system S is physically unique and nonreproducible, and implements an individual function F S . In opposition to a PUF, however, a SIMPL system S possesses a publicly known numerical description, which allows its digital simulation and prediction. At the same time, any such simulation must work at a detectably lower speed than the real-time behavior of S. As argued in [1], SIMPL systems have certain practicality and security advantages in comparison to PUFs, certificates of authenticity, physically obfuscated keys, and also to standard mathematical cryptotechniques.In [1], definitions, protocols, and optical implementations of SIMPL systems were presented. This manuscript focuses on concrete electrical, integrated realizations of SIMPL systems, and proposes two potential candidates: SIMPL systems derived from special SRAM-architectures (socalled "skew designs" of SRAM cells), and implementations based on Cellular Non-Linear Networks (CNNs). IntroductionPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a relatively young, emerging cryptographic primitive [2,3,4,5,6,7]. However, one potential downside of PUF-based protocols is that they usually require a previously shared piece of information (typically some challenge-response-pairs) that was established in a joint set-up phase between the communicants. Alternatively, an online connection to a trusted authority at the time of the protocol execution must be employed. In this particular structural aspect, PUFs are resemblant of classical private key systems.In this paper, we are concerned with an alternative security tool called SIMPL systems, which is a public key version of standard PUFs. SIMPL systems have been introduced in [1]. The acronym SIMPL stands for "SIMulation Possible, but Laborious", and hints at the critical security feature of these structures. A physical system S is called a SIMPL system if the following holds:1. It is possible for everyone to numerically simulate and, thus, to predict the physical behaviour of S with very high accuracy. The basis of the simulation is an individual description D(S) of S, and a generic simulation algorithm Sim, which are both publicly known.

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RF-DNA: Radio-Frequency Certificates of Authenticity

Cited by 62 publications

References 28 publications

Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State of the Art and Future Research Directions

Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study on the State of the Art and Future Research Directions

SECURITY OF QUANTUM-READOUT PUFs AGAINST QUADRATURE-BASED CHALLENGE-ESTIMATION ATTACKS

Towards Electrical, Integrated Implementations of SIMPL Systems

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