Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings

Walker, James M.; Halloran, Matthew

doi:10.1023/b:exec.0000040559.08652.51

Cited by 129 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Previous studies (Sefton et al, 2006;Walker and Halloran, 2004) found that transfer rewards are indeed ineffective in Public Goods games, and we find that this type of rewards is also unable to raise efficiency in Common Pool Resource games. But this does not mean that rewards are generally ineffective.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 45%

“…In the context of social dilemma situations, there are two studies that analyze the impact of rewards on contributions in linear Public Goods games; one by Sefton et al (2006) and one by Walker and Halloran (2004). Both focus on so-called transfer rewards, where the subject giving the reward incurs a cost of a certain number of experimental currency units while the recipient's payoff goes up by the same amount (that is, the impact ratio is 1:1).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

Vyrastekova

Soest

2007

Exp Econ

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We study the effectiveness of costly rewards in mitigating excess extraction in a standard Common Pool Resource (CPR) game experiment. We implement two treatments. In the first, rewards are a pure transfer from one player to the other. In the second, the benefits of receiving a reward are higher than the cost of providing it. Referring to the latter as "net positive" rewards, we observe that these are used more frequently than transfer rewards, and that, unlike transfer rewards, they are effective in sustaining cooperation in the CPR game.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 45%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

Vyrastekova

Soest

2007

Exp Econ

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“…Instead, contributions averaging 50% of the endowment are consistently observed in one-shot PGGs (Walker and Halloran 2004;Kocher et al 2007). Also in repeated PGGs where group composition changes after each round, as in our experiment, subjects initially contribute around 50% on average.…”

Section: Behavior In the Pggsupporting

confidence: 47%

“…High contributors tend to reward other high contributors (Walker and Halloran 2004;Sefton et al 2007;Sutter et al 2010;Ellingsen et al 2012;Choi and Ahn 2013). However, while rewards are mainly allocated to aboveaverage contributors, it is often less clear than for punishment that the amount of rewards received increases with the (positive) deviation from the average group contribution (Walker and Halloran 2004;Sefton et al 2007;Nosenzo and Sefton 2012;Choi and Ahn 2013; but see Ellingsen et al 2012).…”

Section: Behavior In the Pgg With Sanctions Under An Idrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules

et al. 2014

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Punishments and rewards are effective means for establishing cooperation in social dilemmas. We compare a setting where actors individually decide whom to sanction with a setting where sanctions are only implemented when actors collectively agree that a certain actor should be sanctioned. Collective sanctioning decisions are problematic due to the difficulty of reaching consensus. However, when a decision is made collectively, perverse sanctioning (e.g. punishing high contributors) by individual actors is ruled out. Therefore, collective sanctioning decisions are likely to be in the interest of the whole group. We employ a laboratory experiment where subjects play Public Goods Games with opportunities for punishment or reward that is implemented either by an individual, a majority, or unanimously. For both punishment and reward, contribution levels are higher in the individual than the majority condition, and higher under majority than unanimity. Often, majority agreement or unanimity was not reached on punishments or rewards.

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“…For example, Walker and Halloran (2004) find cooperation levels averaging at 53.3% using the same group size (4) and efficiency factor (0.5). Our results are also in line with first round behavior in repeated public goods settings of similar structure (see Zelmer 2003).…”

Section: Cooperation Across Treatmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dark side of leadership: An experiment on religious heterogeneity and cooperation in India

Keuschnigg¹,

Schikora²

2014

The Journal of Socio-Economics

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We investigate voluntary contribution to public goods in culturally heterogeneous groups with a laboratory experiment conducted among 432 Hindu and Muslim subjects in India. With our specification of 'Leading by example' we test for an interaction effect between leadership and religious heterogeneity in a high stake environment. While cultural diversity does not affect contributions in the standard linear Public Goods Game, it reduces cooperation in the presence of a leader. Furthermore, we show that preferences for conditional cooperation are only prevalent in pure groups. In mixed groups, poor leadership and uncertainty about followers' reciprocity hinders the functionality of leadership as an institutional device to resolve social dilemmas.

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Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings

Cited by 129 publications

References 8 publications

On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

Implementing punishment and reward in the public goods game: the effect of individual and collective decision rules

The dark side of leadership: An experiment on religious heterogeneity and cooperation in India

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